The Foreign Service Journal, February 2008

Karl Rove and, ultimately, the president, had other ideas, of course, and the rest is history. Having to return to the negotiating process to justify U.S. disengagement and inaction was the low point of my diplomatic career. FSJ: Why did you leave the State Department? NP: By the end of 2001, it was clear that the Bush administration was on the wrong side of history. When an appointee was named by the White House to take the political position in which I served temporarily, it was time for me to move on. I would have stayed at State if I had been eligible for comparable positions in other areas, but as a Civil Service lawyer I had no opportunity to compete for Foreign Service jobs. FSJ: What U.S. government agencies have the strong- est role in shaping U.S. international climate policy? NP: While I was in government, the White House and the State Department were by far the two most important players. The White House coordinated the interagency policymaking process and managed the domestic politics. Jointly, it and State developed U.S. diplomatic strategies, with the White House taking the lead on heads-of-state engagement, which was frequent. State ran the day-to- day diplomacy and the constant multilateral negotiations, with technical support from other agencies. Despite State’s leadership, neither Warren Christopher nor Made- leine Albright devoted much time to climate change. Instead, each left it to key under secretaries to negotiate directly with the White House and foreign governments. FSJ: Can you describe the problems with the Kyoto Protocol that kept the U.S. from ratifying it? NP: Kyoto is a Rorschach test. It has so many strengths and weaknesses that one can see in it what one wants. Its negatives are easy to state. Kyoto is costly, though not nearly as costly as many claimed; it would have slowed U.S. economic growth by a small fraction of a per- cent. Absent further arrangements, its benefits will be quickly undone by emissions growth in China and India, which Kyoto exempts from action. Kyoto does not solve the climate problem: it lasts only five years, and real solutions will take a century. But as a first step, the Kyoto process had merit. Its core architec- ture — legally binding commitments and innovative mar- ket mechanisms that control costs — is good. I’m confi- dent that with presidential engagement the United States could have negotiated changes to the treaty that would have made it even more affordable and fair. While cost and fairness were the substantive concerns, Kyoto posed a procedural challenge, too. The Clinton administration sought to impose an international consen- sus on a divided Congress — not usually a recipe for suc- cess, particularly on issues of economic importance. FSJ: What are your thoughts on current U.S. policies on climate change (especially the focus on technological developments rather than regulatory approaches)? NP: Everyone agrees that new technologies are neces- sary. The question is how to develop them quickly and cheaply. In my view, we need a multipronged strategy. We need an Apollo Project–style, government-backed research and development program. Through this we should increase federal spending on clean energy tenfold and ask other industrialized nations to match our commit- ment. We also need strong and steady economic incen- tives for companies to reduce emissions. Mandatory emis- sion limits or carbon taxes would work. These policies would accelerate the transformation to clean energy. The Clinton administration tried to pursue both approaches, but lacked the necessary political clout and the support of Congress. The Bush administration has made some progress in increasing clean energy R&D, but has refused to consider taxes and regulation. Because pri- vate innovation is absolutely critical, enacting comprehen- sive federal legislation that makes emitting greenhouse gases costly must be our highest priority. Until we do that, the United States will have no international credibility, and other nations will hide behind U.S. inaction. FSJ: Can you describe any U.S. policy successes on cli- mate change? NP: The United States was the driving force behind creation in 1988 of the Nobel Peace Prize–winning Inter- governmental Panel on Climate Change, the world’s lead- ing scientific body on the subject. For two decades American scientists and U.S. government funding have been major factors in that organization’s success. The U.S. pioneered emissions trading to combat acid rain and championed its application to climate change. That idea has now taken root in Europe, which was once skeptical. Behind the scenes, U.S. negotiators and lawyers have made real contributions on various technical issues, as well. F O C U S F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 37