The Foreign Service Journal, February 2009

countering growing narcotics traffick- ing from Andean Ridge countries, and then — particularly after the 9/11 at- tacks —countering terrorism through- out the hemisphere. In light of this history, here is the crucial question for President Obama’s national security team: Is a military re- sponse the right way (let alone the best or most cost-efficient one) to counter the twin threats of terrorism and nar- cotrafficking in Latin America? For that is now the primary rationale for having a four-star military command with Latin America as its sole area of responsibility, notwithstanding laud- able efforts by the current SOUTH- COM commander, Admiral James Stavridis, and his predecessor, General Bantz Craddock, to reshape SOUTH- COM’s mission to include more inter- agency components and participation. The Development Conundrum A principal deficiency suffered by virtually all developing countries, but particularly those in Africa and Latin America, is weak civil law enforcement institutions –- both the police and judi- cial branches. Police forces are, by and large, ill trained, poorly equipped, in- competently led and badly paid. The same can be said for the majority of judges and other law enforcement au- thorities. This is a prescription for cor- ruption and abuse, so it should come as absolutely no surprise that that has been the result. Washington’s response, regrettably, has been to look for ways our military, acting through SOUTHCOM and now AFRICOM, can ameliorate or rectify these problems. But is that the right, let alone best, means to help our Latin American neighbors or African friends with these structural prob- lems? To see what AFRICOM could become, look at what SOUTHCOM has been. 14 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 9 S P E A K I N G O U T