The Foreign Service Journal, February 2009

friend Frederick Douglass. “Common sense and some lit- tle knowledge of law … will carry me through,” he added optimistically. It would certainly require more than common sense to navigate the treacherous waters of the Haitian war, how- ever. Telegraphs could not yet instantly transmit messages to every corner of the globe, so messages passed between Washington and embassies the old-fashioned way: via hand- written letters. And because of this, two things were of ut- most importance — accuracy in reporting and good handwriting. Bassett possessed both of these attributes, and his memos back to Washing- ton displayed a quick grasp of the unfolding political situation on the island. Given the amount of time it required for Washington to receive this reporting, however, Bassett knew he would be forced to act first and ask for forgiveness later. His first challenge came as the government of Sylvain Salnave began to crumble under the pres- sure of the rebellion by General Jean Nicholas Nissage Saget. As the situation deteriorated, Bassett felt compelled to call for help and pleaded with Secretary of State Hamilton Fish for a warship: “Please send one immediately and keep it constantly here.” It was a cry he repeated numerous times throughout that year. But with Washington turning a deaf ear to his appeals, he worked out an arrangement with the French and British legations, both of whom oversaw numerous warships in the harbor of Port-au-Prince. If American in- terests required assistance, Bassett had to personally con- vince them to provide support. The diplomat also leased a new office for the legation, located in a fireproof building to prevent the destruction of irreplaceable records in the event of the much-rumored looting and burning of the city. All of this he did without any guidance from his capital. As the battles continued, hundreds of refugees filled his residential compound in the hills overlooking the city and errant shells landed on his grounds. Meanwhile, the De- partment of State had sent instructions denying Bassett au- thority to accept political refugees. Though accepting refugees was a practice commonly used by the European powers on the island, Secretary Fish found it had no basis in law. Bassett was in a quandary: should he protect the women and children huddled in his residence or strictly obey a State Department circular? As Saget’s forces finally overwhelmed the remnants of the old regime, Bassett went to negotiate for the safe passage of those seeking asylum. But Saget was reluctant, demanding a list of refugees so that he could determine which might actually be political enemies. Bassett refused, boldly telling him: “You will par- don me for reminding [you] that the holding of women and children as hostages is repugnant to modern civilization and especially to the government of the United States.” He went on to warn the Haitian rebel leader that if he harbored any hopes of good bilateral rela- tions, he should simply allow the release of the refugees. Saget finally gave in, and with little regard for his own safety — and despite a tropical fever — the American minister personally es- corted the throng of refugees into the heart of the capital soon after sunset so that they might return to their homes. Other captured political opponents did not fare as well as Bassett’s group. Many were quickly killed by having their throats slit. During his eight years in Port- au-Prince, Bassett would deal with several similar incidents, as Saget faced a coup from General Michel Domingue, who in turn faced a coup from General Boisrand Canal. In all cases, the defeated side invariably rushed to seek help from foreign legations, and the American legation most prominently. Bassett also handled U.S.-citizen commer- cial claims, enforced diplomatic immunity for his consular and commercial agents, and endured hurricanes, fires and numerous tropical diseases. His Finest Hour The case that posed the greatest challenge to Bassett, however, was that of political refugee General Boisrand Canal. The general was another of the young leaders who had successfully ousted Salnave from power. By the time of the subsequent Domingue regime in the mid-1870s, he had retired to his home outside the capital. The new Hait- ian president, however, brutally hunted down any per- ceived threat, including Canal. The knock on Bassett’s door that came at 3 a.m. on May 3, 1875, shattered the illusion of any settlement of this lat- F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 31 Given the amount of time it required for Washington to receive his reporting, Bassett knew he would be forced to act first and ask for forgiveness later.