The Foreign Service Journal, February 2011

F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 1 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 27 gion, our companies were in a strong position to benefit from American “soft power,” getting in on the ground floor of energy develop- ment in the region, and winning contracts to create jobs at home. But these two complementary goals were not explicitly joined, for policy necessity (get the pipelines built) largely won out over practicality (pursue an equally well-coordi- nated, sustained effort to use this leverage to ensure U.S. firms get their share of the business). Such advocacy is inherently difficult when bidding on projects tendered by private-sector firms, which make their procurement decisions based largely on commercial and technical criteria. This disconnect became particu- larly evident when the same firms that lobbied Washing- ton for policy support with host governments in the region rebuffed U.S. government advocacy for greater American content in multibillion dollar tenders. In their view, government advocacy should not interfere with a firm’s business decisions. In the end, U.S. firms received a small portion of contracts in deals that were largely, if not wholly, in- fluenced by Washington. The les- son to be learned: integrate U.S. soft power on the policy side with the real needs of U.S. firms in a hy- percompetitive global market place. An astute ambassador and deputy chief of mission can work with the rest of the country team to make that very case to Washington deci- sion-makers. Indeed, trade advocacy is an area particularly well- suited to country team coordination, for it directly benefits American firms. Commerce’s Trade Advocacy Center co- F O C U S With the growing speed of international commerce, the distinction between policy analysis and business development has become increasingly blurred.