The Foreign Service Journal, February 2011

28 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 1 ordinates assistance for U.S. com- pany bids on major projects through phone calls, letters and meetings at a senior level, from the White House on down. Based on anec- dotal evidence, this interagency co- operation is now often seen in foreign military sales and defense advocacy, where State, Commerce and Defense support the foreign policy, commercial and defense di- mensions of a given transaction. In order to be competitive in a given tender, U.S. firms typically seek the embassy’s advice regarding host-government considerations and third-country com- petition. For example, when a state-owned airline issues a Request for Proposal for purchase of several aircraft, the effort will affect many parts of the host-government bu- reaucracy and, indirectly, the U.S. embassy country team. An economic section’s contacts with the finance ministry can provide insight into the availability of sovereign guar- antees for the transaction, while FCS’s relationships with American and host-country firms can inform negotiating strategies. In addition, the political section can provide early warning of the arrival of a high-level governmental delegation from a competitor country. Last but not least, FCS can work with the U.S. Export- Import Bank to develop a project finance proposal that lu- bricates the transaction, while the U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s training grants program can aug- ment the bid. The stakes are high: a well-orchestrated country team that executes well on such a transaction can often influence a successful outcome— securing business for small, medium and large U.S. firms and creating needed jobs at home. A Standard for Intra-Mission Cooperation In my experience, the “Holy Grail” of intra-mission co- operation was seen in Kazakhstan in the mid-1990s. Aware that the newly independent states represented markets with major potential, U.S. firms rushed in to scout the prospects. But the initial euphoria soon turned to cyni- cism, as the weak legal infrastructure stymied efforts to trade and invest. To respond effectively to increasing expressions of busi- ness concern, Embassy Almaty needed a mechanism to fuse the concerns of the private sector with the stated (and largely genuine) interest of the host gov- ernment to attract American trade and investment. Led by a business- savvy, team-building front office, USAID, ECON and FCS all used their respective strengths to secure a series of policy reforms and im- prove the business climate. USAID trade and investment policy advisers, often accomplished attorneys and experts in their own right, helped draft and redraft laws and regulations in cooperation with the host government. FCS used its contacts with Ameri- can firms and the local business community to identify the specifics of a problemwith customs, standards or banking, then shared this real-world perspective with USAID con- tractors. And ECON ensured that key host-government representatives were informed of our efforts to ensure buy-in to the process at all levels, and provided reporting and analysis to keep Washington informed and prepared for VIP visits where we could push key issues to resolu- tion. To frame key issues for senior host-government deci- sion-makers, the mission produced a trade and investment non-paper with short descriptions of each business issue and a two- or three-sentence recommendation on how to resolve it. Ambassador Beth Jones used her well-devel- oped relationships with the host government to push for results, creatively weaving in U.S. VIP visits and pushing for movement before their arrival, when leverage was at its peak. This approach was gratefully embraced by Amer- ican and local firms, which rarely wanted to take on these issues with the host government for fear of reprisal. Such cooperation led to the rollback of controversial customs pre-shipment verifications; elimination of manda- tory temporary warehousing that raised the cost of doing business; and rescission of compulsory oil and gas insur- ance provisions, among other reforms. Perhaps even more importantly, that initial missionwide team effort spawned the founding of a local chapter of the American Chamber of Commerce, thereby creating a long-termmechanism for trade and investment policy engagement. And the sense of cooperation and camaraderie in working together on a major, successful joint project increased trust between F O C U S As a rule, FCS should be the primary interlocutor with U.S. and host-country businesses and trade associations, while ECON should lead on policy matters, reporting and analysis.