The Foreign Service Journal, February 2012

F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 2 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 13 R eorganization proposals are often dismissed with the com- ment that they amount to reshuffling the deck chairs on the Titanic. But, what if the proposal in question called for a structural change that — to extend the analogy —would keep the ship from sinking? Although the Quadrennial Diplo- macy and Development Review report is primarily a strategic policy docu- ment, it also addresses organizational questions. These proposed changes concern operational matters and, very specifically, interagency cooperation. Perhaps such changes can prevent for- eign policy failure, the governmental equivalent of a vessel sinking. Although the reorganization of the State Department proposed in the QDDR is not massive, it would signif- icantly improve how the Foreign Serv- ice does business. Its recommenda- tions are all derived from the funda- mental concept of “smart power” as wielded by a single team. Some organizational changes are envisaged to assist in achieving this ob- ject: e.g., elevating the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to the level of a bureau, and reformulating the relationship be- tween State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. In addi- tion, the study takes a fresh look at the question of chief-of-mission authority and program management. The COM as CEO Specifically, the QDDR notes the need to “empower and hold account- able chiefs of mission as chief executive officers of interagency missions.” In a sense, this is nothing new. After all, since the days of President Harry Tru- man chiefs of mission have always been empowered, and instructed, to serve as the CEOs of U.S. diplomatic missions. In addition, presidential letters going back to Dwight Eisenhower, as well as federal legislation, state that “Under the direction of the president, the chief of mission to a foreign coun- try shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of all government executive branch employees in that country (except for Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees under the command of a United States area military commander).” Under this authority, the ambassa- dor is supposed to perform the role of the chief executive officer of a multia- gency mission. As the QDDR points out, “the best ambassadors play that role effectively.” However, it is no se- cret that the executive authority of am- bassadors as chiefs of mission has often been challenged and restricted in the interplay of bureaucratic competition and policy debate. In addition, the managerial expert- ise of ambassadors varies widely, yet the department has devoted little thought or effort to offering back- ground information and training. The clear objective of the QDDR reforms in this area, therefore, is to turn occa- sional effectiveness into something more robust and persistent. Empowering or reinvigorating chiefs of mission in the way called for in the QDDR will require expanded support from the National Security Council and other agencies to do two things: ensure that U.S. government personnel understand and internalize their accountability to the chief of mis- sion, and clarify the reporting struc- tures for all U.S. civilians in country. … And Country Director The QDDR also calls for COMs to engage directly in high-level policy- making back inWashington. This idea is a bit more radical, yet it reflects what Implementing the QDDR at Chief-of-Mission Level B Y E DWARD M ARKS S PEAKING O UT The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review is a useful springboard for broader restructuring.