The Foreign Service Journal, February 2012

such tasks, resulting in their delegation to the military by default, if not by presidential decision. The attendant in- troduction of military personnel and re- sources from the regional combatant command, as well as the regional char- acter of a particular contingency, cur- rently constrains the management capability of the resident ambassador(s). Toward that end, it might be feasi- ble to expand the COM concept, stay- ing strictly within the bureaucratic boundaries of State and USAID but applying it to all missions conducted within those boundaries. Even mili- tary personnel and resources could conceivably be included under this “Mission Manager-COM” arrange- ment if those resources were assigned — or “chopped” in military parlance — to the mission, in much the way de- fense attachés and military assistance personnel are. In the case of emergencies requir- ing a mammoth surge in U.S. govern- ment involvement (often including the military) — such as a tsunami, geno- cide or post-conflict reconstruction project; a “special situation” such as the U.S. role in Afghanistan and Pakistan; or developments in countries where no permanent U.S. mission exists — the authority to name chiefs of mission could be extended to include situation- specific appointments. This approach would be especially useful in address- ing regional challenges. Integrating COMs into Foggy Bottom The second category of reform is much more radical and moves beyond the boundaries of the QDDR. How- ever, it involves a concept and per- spective that follow the logic of that review and is worth future considera- tion. Specifically, it calls for exporting chief-of-mission authority back into headquarters, explicitly assigning it to the key management levels: the Secre- tary of State and the six regional assis- tant secretaries. With this authority, State could ex- ercise integrated management and di- rection of all U.S.government civilian and political-military international op- erations. Thus empowered, regional assistant secretaries (possibly expanded to the under-secretary level) would constitute a middle tier in the chain of command. This would ensure that policy and resources are integrated and coordi- nated at the policy level and then flow down to country teams, rather than going directly through discrete bu- reaucratic and authority stovepipes. It would also alleviate, if not eliminate, the current organizational competition at the country level. Under this system, the combatant commands would continue to prepare and review war plans through the ex- isting military chain of command — but regional assistant secretaries would assist with developing the pre- and post-conflict phases (Phase 0 and Phase IV) of those plans and the the- ater security cooperation plans of the combatant commanders. These State officials could thereby fulfill the Defense Department’s long- standing desire for an effective coun- terpart at the operational level of State to their geographic commanders. This would forge a strong relationship be- tween peacetime engagement and de- terrence, and maintain a stable policy in such regions. The regional assistant secretaries would have primary responsibility for integrating all federal operations and implementation within their areas of responsibility, with the exception of military forces engaged in active oper- ations. They would be responsible for producing integrated regional strate- gies and reviewing and approving all departmental and agency plans that drive activity and resource allocations. This includes country team plans (Strategic Mission Plans), DOD secu- rity cooperation efforts and foreign as- sistance programs.. Such a clear operational chain of command to manage field operations, running from the Secretary of State through regional assistant secretaries to chiefs of mission, would replicate at each level the authority and role that chiefs of mission are already supposed to exercise through their country teams. In sum, the whole Department of State would be organized as a “Na- tional Team,” under which policy and resource integration would take place at three formally designated levels (in addition to informal coordination at all levels): the secretarial or Cabinet level, the regional assistant secretary level, and the country team level. (This would also apply to emergencies, whether handled by special teams, missions or both.) S P E A K I N G O U T The QDDR also calls for chiefs of mission to engage directly in high- level policymaking back in Washington. F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 2 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 15