The Foreign Service Journal, February 2013

14 FEBRUARY 2013 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 13. The department should assign key policy, program and security per- sonnel at high-risk, high-threat posts for a minimum of one year. For less critical personnel, the temporary duty length should be no less than 120 days. The ARB suggests a comprehensive review of human resources authorities with an eye to using those authorities to promote sending more experienced officers, including When Actually Employed personnel, to these high-risk, high-threat locations, particularly in security and management positions for longer periods of time. 14. The department needs to review the staffing footprints at high-risk, high- threat posts, with particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally Employed Staff and management support. High- risk, high-threat posts must be funded and the human resources process prioritized to hire LES interpreters and translators. 15. With increased and more com- plex diplomatic activities in the Middle East, the department should enhance its ongoing efforts to significantly upgrade its language capacity, especially Arabic, SITE OF THE MONTH : Internet Archive E stablished in July 2002, Internet Archive is a 501(c) (3) nonprofit digital library that offers free access to books, movies and music, as well as archived Web pages. Like a physical library, the site functions as a repository of cultural artifacts and data for use by researchers, histori- ans, scholars and the general public. The site’s “Wayback Machine” enables visitors to browse more than 150 billion Web pages the site’s volunteers have archived, from 1996 through late 2012. Simply type in the Web address of a site or page where you would like to start, and press enter; then select from the archived dates available. The search results will point to other archived pages at as close a date as possible. (Unlike the rest of the site, keyword searching is not cur- rently supported for the Wayback Machine.) The home page also features daily “Curator’s Choice” selections from its holdings in Community Video (1,111,736 selections) , Live Music (110,717 concerts), Com- munity Audio (1,480,975 recordings) and Texts ( 3,802,776 items). Institutional support for the Internet Archive comes from Alexa Internet, the Prelinger Archives, Lizard Tech, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Kahle/Austin Foundation and the Library of Congress. —Steven Alan Honley, Editor among American employees, including DS, and receive greater resources to do so. 16. A panel of Senior Special Agents and Supervisory Special Agents should revisit DS high-threat training with respect to active internal defense and fire survival, as well as chief of mission protective detail training. 17. The Diplomatic Security Train- ing Center and Foreign Service Insti- tute should collaborate in designing joint courses that integrate high-threat training and risk management deci- sion processes for senior and mid-level DS agents and Foreign Service officers, and better prepare them for leadership positions in high-risk, high-threat posts. They should consult throughout the U.S. government for best practices and lessons learned. Foreign affairs counter- threat training should be mandatory for high-risk, high-threat posts, whether an individual is assigned permanently or in longer-term temporary duty status. 18 . The department should ensure provision of adequate fire safety and security equipment for safe havens and safe areas in non-Inman/SECCA [Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999] facilities, as well as high-threat Inman facilities. 19. There have been technological advancements in non-lethal deter- rents, and the State Department should ensure it rapidly and routinely identi- fies and procures additional options for non-lethal deterrents in high-risk, high-threat posts and trains personnel on their use. 20. DS should upgrade surveillance cameras at high-risk, high-threat posts for greater resolution, nighttime visibil- ity and monitoring capability beyond post. 21. Post-2001, intelligence collection has expanded exponentially, but the Benghazi attacks are a stark reminder that we cannot over-rely on the cer- tainty or even likelihood of warning intelligence. Careful attention should be given to factors showing a deteriorating threat situation in general as a basis for improving security posture. Key trends must be quickly identified and used to sharpen risk calculations. 22. The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis should report directly to