The Foreign Service Journal, February 2013

contractors lost their lives in Afghanistan than did soldiers. The State Department has traditionally relied on a combination of host- government support and official American and local staff to guard its embassies and consulates. But once it became clear that this approach was no longer adequate to meet the challenge of sustaining long-term operations in dangerous environments like Iraq and Afghani- stan, State turned to multinational private security contractors to plug the gaps. It is impossible to prove that outsourcing security is always more expensive, but there is ample evidence that the practice does not guarantee cost-effectiveness. For example, an August 2008 report from the Congressional Budget Office concluded that it actually cost the State Department more to hire Blackwa- ter to provide security than it would have to rely on Army units in Iraq. A 2011 study by the Project on Government Oversight found that in 33 of 35 occupations, the government actually paid billions of dollars more to hire contractors for services than it would have cost for govern- ment employees to do the same work. The study also found that contractors were paid more than twice as much as government direct hires, on average, for performing the same functions. The cost of benefits for any government employee closes this gap. But in the security realm, this offsetting effect is smaller because many security contractors are retired military personnel, whose training and benefits have already been funded by the U.S. taxpayer. Even if we assume that contracting out State’s security operations has always been cost-effective, it has come at a high strategic price. Any favorable cost calculation presupposes, THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | FEBRUARY 2013 27 It is easier to secure funds for programs than to ensure the money is well spent.