The Foreign Service Journal, February 2013

34 FEBRUARY 2013 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Combating Nuclear Proliferation Today there is widespread agreement that the MAD doctrine is obsolete, and such threats as terrorism, ethnic conflict, asym- metric warfare and the illicit trade in nuclear materials cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons. Yet Moscow and Washington are still stuck in the nuclear deterrence mindset. Even if nuclear deterrence is assumed to retain some value in situations where peace is still conditional, the global num- bers don’t need to be in the tens of thousands. That creates incentives to proliferation. Instead, we need to create disincen- tives. This is what Adlai Stevenson quickly came to understand, especially during his tenure at the United Nations. New complications, such as cyberwarfare, almost guarantee that a reliance on nuclear deterrence will become increasingly hazardous. Estonia has already been the victim of cyberwarfare, and so has Georgia, before and during its 2008 war with Russia. In addition, Iran and the United States have reportedly traded cyberattacks. Just imagine the Cuban Missile Crisis with terrorists egging on both sides with false messages. That thought experiment underscores how unwise it is to depend on a bluff—which is what nuclear deterrence really is—in such situations. Nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are clear and present dangers to the United States, so the tightest possible control over uranium and plutonium everywhere in the world is absolutely essential. Two Nuclear Security Summits during Pres. Obama’s first term helped achieve that goal, but only com- pletely drying up the reservoirs of nuclear weapons will deny terrorists access to ready-made warheads. But long before all the world’s nuclear weapons are elimi- nated, there are steps, like a ban on nuclear test explosions and a cessation of producing the fissile materials used in bombs, that would stop any increase in the number of countries that possess nuclear weapons. And if we don’t do those things soon, it is predictable that more nuclear weapons in more hands will eventually lead to a nuclear explosion in one of the world’s great cities. Adlai Stevenson realized that we are skating on thin ice where nuclear weapons are concerned. But we have all become so used to them that we no longer think about the danger. The idea of eliminating these weapons seems unreal, a distraction from our day-to-day problems. The entry into force on Feb. 5, 2011, of the New START Treaty was a step toward safety. But much more needs to be done— starting with the very nuclear test ban which Adlai Stevenson pioneered and fought for decades ago. President Obama called for a world free of nuclear weapons in his 2009 Prague speech, a goal Vice President Joe Biden reaffirmed in a major policy speech the following year. That declaration was significant because Biden said that a world without nuclear weapons would also be a compass by which the administration would steer current policy. Specifi- cally, he announced the administration’s strong support for increased funding for the nation’s nuclear weapons laborato- ries. This was the same message that Shultz, Kissinger, Perry and Nunn had delivered in their 2007 Wall Street Journal opinion piece. The essential point in these statements is that America’s real nuclear deterrent resides in the skills of its scientists and engineers, more than in the numbers and types of weapons that have been manufactured at any given time. That will remain true even if all of the world’s nuclear weapons have been elimi- nated. The Test Ban Treaty: A Crucial Link Because of the successes of American scientists and engi- neers in maintaining a safe and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons, even in the absence of any American nuclear test explosions since 1992, the United States can confidently embark on a campaign to enlist all of the world’s possessors of nuclear weapons in a long-term effort to reduce and eliminate those weapons. A joint enterprise will be required to accomplish this, one that embraces many nations, not just Russia. For this same reason, the United States can safely work for the entry into force of a comprehensive, global ban on all explo- sive nuclear tests. This will not be easy, for some nations will want to enjoy the freedom to test their newly designed nuclear weapons, unencumbered by a treaty banning their tests. The most threatening of those nations are not friendly toward the United States; nor are they friends of the nuclear Just as in the 1960s, we should ask: Should a two-sided (or more) nuclear war begin, would reason prevail before it was too late?