The Foreign Service Journal, March 2003

F O C U S O N P O W E L L hen the general who had overseen Desert Storm was appointed secretary of State in January 2001, observers in the Middle East won- dered about the signifi- cance of this choice. As a political scientist and an Arab, I felt that the appointment of Colin Powell indicated that the new administration intended to use all available means — including military ones if neces- sary— to guarantee Israel’s securi- ty and regional stability. Clearly, the new U.S. government intend- ed to allow Israel to abandon the peace process that previous administrations had helped negoti- ate, and to oppose any threats to the conservative regimes of the region. Hence, I felt that the Arabs could not count on the new secre- tary of State to push for a more balanced and equitable policy in the Middle East, much less to defend or promote the interests of the countries of the region. Little has happened thus far to prove me wrong. The tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, further exacerbated tensions in U.S.-Arab relations. Washing- ton’s subsequent declaration of the war against terrorism was seen by many Arabs and Muslims as noth- ing more than a continuation of pre-existing American hostility towards them, except that the hostility was now expressed openly and with a sense of legitimacy. To counter that reaction, President Bush, Secretary Powell, and other high U.S. officials made gestures and issued declarations designed to reassure governments and public opinion that the target of U.S. policy is terrorism, and not Muslims or Arabs. A notable example of such efforts is Mr. Powell’s speech at the Heritage Foundation on Dec. 12, 2002. In that speech, the secretary of State announced a “U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative” aimed at “all the peoples of the Middle East to improve their daily lives and to help them face the future with hope.” An Ineffective Prescription My first reaction was to won- der why Mr. Powell decided to deliver it at all, why he did not deliver it in November as initial- ly scheduled, and why he chose the Heritage Foundation as his host. It seems most unlikely that he really believed that the initia- tive would improve the tarnished U.S. image in the region. Therefore, one is tempted to dis- miss the initiative as just another symbolic gesture designed to win the good will of Arabs and Muslims; its author must or should have known that it could have no more effect than visits to mosques by politicians, iftar meals held at the White House during the month of Ramadan, and other similar gestures. W P OWELL AND THE A RAB W ORLD : A N ORTH A FRICAN V IEW W HATEVER C OLIN P OWELL ’ S PERSONAL CONVICTIONS ARE , HIS STANDING IN THE A RAB WORLD IS NOT HIGH . N OR IS IT LIKELY TO IMPROVE ANYTIME SOON . B Y B ECHIR C HOUROU M A R C H 2 0 0 3 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 25