The Foreign Service Journal, March 2004

to make a fresh and certainly less tainted job of rebuilding. The dissolution of the Nazi — I mean Ba’th—Party in “Operation Round-Up Ready” has also been described as an error. There is talk about valuable talent purportedly lost to the “New Iraq” because the state will be denied the services of certain school headmistresses or hospital administrators. Those affected supposedly joined the party under duress, or for nonpolitical reasons. These claims are often factually wrong, and in any case are not germane. We had to seize the moment and move fast to root out a profoundly rotten governing structure. Flowers may well have been lost along with the brambles. Revolutions are not nuanced, and that is just what we were trying to carry out in the first few months of the CPA. (Shiite leaders, on the other hand, believe the CPA has been too forbearing in its pursuit and punishment of former Ba’this.) The Ba’th Party’s structures, however, extended too far, and too deep, into Iraqi society to be sufficiently eradicat- ed by the CPA. Our first efforts in this regard, though, will have helped any new Iraqi government over some of the most painful early stages of political purification. In the end, it will be up to the Iraqis to see de-Ba’thification through to whatever extent they wish or deem necessary. Regrettably, two other important measures are like- ly to be delayed. One is the thoroughgoing rationaliza- tion of Iraq’s inefficient economy and agriculture. Of several hundred Saddam-era government-owned enterprises, only a minority could survive in an open market economy. Allowing Adam Smith to have his way, however, would throw innumerable urban workers out on the street. Something similar is true of agricul- ture: Iraq used to grow its own food, and was among the world’s leading exporters of dates. Saddam, though, was more concerned with control than produc- tivity. Iraqi farmers became accustomed to guaran- teed, subsidized agricultural inputs, and a guaranteed market (at inflated prices) for their crops. Meanwhile, Iraq came to import 60 percent of its foodstuffs. Date exports were negligible. Today, Iraqi farmers would be crushed by “globalized” competitors. The CPA does not want a wave of “Okies” moving from their aban- doned farms into Baghdad and other cities. Accordingly, it seems likely that Iraq’s economy and agriculture will both, for the time being, be spared the surgeon’s knife. A second is the CPA’s reluctance to confront the chal- lenge of certain radical Shiite clergy. Iraq’s Shiites have traditionally been led by “grand ayatollahs,” who have tra- ditionally preferred a moral and pastoral role over direct involvement in politics. The current leader of Iraq’s Shiites is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Of Persian origin, Sistani survived the Saddam years due to his great pres- tige, and more importantly, by avoiding direct conflict with the Ba’thi government. Some colleagues of Sistani’s who were almost as august, but more “political,” did not. One was executed by having nails driven into his skull, another by having acid injected into his brain. The attitude of the grand ayatollahs toward the CPA was, in the main, discreetly welcoming. Increasingly, though, these quietists are being challenged by younger, less erudite, and more radical junior clergy and would-be clergy. Their leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, has scant religious qualifications, but bears an honored name. He is also a prime suspect in the murder of a religious rival, the son of Sistani’s mentor, Grand Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-Khoi. Justice for him will probably come — if ever — at the hands of a future Iraqi administration. It would seem as if action now against him, by the CPA, would be too inflammatory. He and his followers will cause trouble for the CPA and any future Iraqi government. The Governing Council In July 2003, Jerry Bremer appointed a 25-person “Governing Council” as a first step toward a future sover- eign government of Iraq. The appointment of its mem- bers followed months of negotiations with various Iraqi constituencies. The process was similar to a college admission’s office putting together a balanced class of good performers. The GC includes a Christian, five Kurds, 13 Arab Shiites, and five Arab Sunnis. Twenty-two of its initial members were men, and three were women. The council was given substantial power, including such tasks as drawing up the 2004 budget, overseeing the min- istries, and rebuilding the military. A second step was the announcement on Nov. 15 that the council, in consultation with Amb. Bremer, had decid- ed on “the process to form a constitutional convention to draft a permanent constitution” and to set out a new time- line by which the CPA will transfer sovereignty by July 1, 2004. Prior to that, the Governing Council is to draft a “fundamental law” in consultation with the CPA, specify- ing a Bill of Rights, and a timetable for drafting and ratify- ing a permanent constitution. Elections for a permanent F O C U S 32 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 4