The Foreign Service Journal, March 2004

Iraqi government were set for Dec. 31, 2005; meanwhile, a Transitional Assembly, a substantial expansion of the GC, would begin to govern Iraq as of May 31, 2004. Looking ahead, the transfer of sov- ereignty to Iraqis on July 1 will not and cannot change. That is an action which once announced, cannot be recalled by a serious, major participant in world politics, such as the U.S. The modali- ties outlined above, however, whereby Iraqis implement their sovereignty, may change. Concessions may have to be made to the demand of Grand Ayatollah Sistani that the new government be chosen by direct elections. The CPA maintains that because Iraq lacks an electoral law, defined electoral constituencies, and a current census, there isn’t time enough to organize direct elections. Security could be a problem, too. Various compromises may be offered, some perhaps involving the United Nations. But many Iraqis, and not just the CPA, believe Iraq’s political future would be off to a bad start were it to begin with major concessions to an unelected churchman — who himself may be influenced by the voices of younger, radical rivals. Looking ahead, we may intend a certain kind of sovereignty for Iraq: one that is sovereign, indeed, but where, at the same time, coalition forces are welcome, human rights are respected, and the political system is democratic. These codicils to Iraq’s independence are all worthy, but either a country is inde- pendent or it is not. In the coming months it may be hard to direct into responsible channels the exuberant dynam- ics we have loosed. Arab politics has a term: “Muzaayadah,” or “overbid- ding;” i.e., whatever your opponent says or offers, go him one better. As July 1 nears, there will be elbowing and F O C U S M A R C H 2 0 0 4 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 33 “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was seen by us as necessary, justified and even overdue.