The Foreign Service Journal, March 2004

arrive at a democratic system in Iraq. Third, despite the previous setbacks, the plan still aimed at exporting a U.S.-designed demo- cratic system to Iraq. The Revised Plan Meets Reality The first stage of the envisaged process includes the writing of an interim constitution (called first Basic Law, then Fundamental Law, and, at the time of this writing, Transitional Administrative Law), and the formation, per- haps through regional caucuses, of a transitional assembly that would, in turn, choose an interim government. At the end of the first phase, in June 2004, the United States would officially restore the sovereignty of Iraq. The sec- ond stage, between March and December 2005, includes the election of a constituent assembly, the approval by that assembly of a permanent constitution, a nationwide process of consultation on the proposed constitution, its approval in a referendum, and, finally, the election of a national assembly. Compared to previous plans dictated by the United States, the agreement proposed a much more democrat- ic process. Nevertheless, several factors indicate clearly that the Bush administration still hopes to be able to export to Iraq a political system of its own design. Amb. Jerry Bremer, the head of the CPA, made it clear, for example, that the United States would play a major role in writing the interim constitution, embedding in it essential institutions and values the permanent constitu- tion would have to respect. Thus, by the time the elect- ed constituent assembly drafted the permanent docu- ment, the major issues would already have been decided. In another indication that the United States intended to use the writing of the interim constitution to export a ready-made system to Iraq, a number of American experts on constitutional law and democracy were hired to work as consultants to the CPA after the plan was announced. Finally, the timetable set out in the agreement left no doubt that the permanent constitution would be largely written before the constituent assembly was elected: the plan only allows a paltry nine months between the election of the constituent assembly in March 2005 and the election of the new national assembly by December 2005. This is certain- ly not adequate time to write a constitution, hold a true national consultation about it, submit it to a referendum, put in place the new electoral system required by the constitution and, finally, orga- nize elections for a national assembly. Since the agreement was reached last November, the plan to impose on Iraq the institutional model of democra- cy and the values favored by the United States has been dashed again by the reality of the balance of power in the country. The idea of a U.S.-style federal system composed of 18 provinces has been under- mined by the Kurds’ insistence that Kurdistan must maintain the autonomy gained during the 1990s. The U.S. was forced to accede to this demand by the real- ization that unless it did so, the entire transition timetable, and possibly the entire plan, would be in jeopardy. While the recognition of an autonomous Kurdistan is supposedly just an interim measure, it will probably be impossible to reverse in the future. The balance of power has also forced a so-far- unsuccessful process of negotiations between the CPA and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has no official role but does have a substantial following, and threatens to undermine the transition plan by insisting that even the transitional assembly must be elected. Finally, the balance of power in the country has already made it a foregone conclusion that the interim constitution will have to recognize a special place for Islam in the Iraqi state, another departure from the secular model the U.S. would like to implant there. It is now clear that the United States cannot use a prolonged occupation to impose the system it favors, as it did in Germany and Japan. It is equally clear that the United States does not have strong, pro-democracy part- ners with whom to work, as it had in Germany; it does not even have a cooperative, weakened authority figure, as the Japanese emperor proved to be. The exiles on whom the United States initially counted for implanting democracy in Iraq are struggling to establish their legit- F O C U S 42 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 4 It is now clear that the United States cannot use a prolonged occupation to impose the system it favors, as it did in Germany and Japan.