The Foreign Service Journal, March 2004

After our troops set up the airport as their primary base in the city, it became the unofficial American con- sulate. Iraqis began to come to the gates requesting everything from visas for the United States to telephone calls to relatives in other countries. Generally, the com- mon concerns at this time were security from looters, jobs, repairing utilities and availability of gas. A public affairs campaign was immediately put into action in the form of television ads that discouraged Iraqis from civil disobedience and encouraged them to set up their own system of government and go back to their jobs. But the difficulty with going back to work was that no one wanted to leave their homes and families unprotected from looters. Also, the banks had all been looted and there wasn’t money available to pay salaries. Many Iraqis claimed to have information regarding WMD sites, the location of personnel in Saddam’s regime and locations of weapons caches, as well as information on a huge variety of other topics they felt American mili- tary personnel might consider important. Several of them even offered information in exchange for American citizenship. Residents soon began selling cigarettes, candy and soda to U.S. soldiers in front of the gates. This was ben- eficial for both parties and helped build rapport with the Iraqi people. But they became impatient within days of the American occupation because there was no immediate improvement in the quality of life for most people. Unfortunately, the Pentagon spent so much time plan- ning and implementing a highly successful military cam- paign that it didn’t plan how to immediately implement strategies that would have made it clear what the Americans planned to do to improve the quality of life for Iraqi citizens as promised. Nor did the Pentagon have an immediate plan of action for dealing with Saddam’s loyal- ists or with Ba’th Party members. And the coalition missed the opportunity to negotiate early with those who are driving the insurgency against security forces in Iraq today. But whether the occupation of Iraq was justified or not is immaterial at this point. The challenge is to pro- vide a stable environment for the fledging Iraqi govern- ment until it can function securely. For until it becomes certain that the insurgency has failed to intimidate the new political leadership, Iraqis will be afraid to offer assistance to coalition forces or the Iraqi police and secu- rity forces for fear of reprisals. America has promised repeatedly that the occupation of Iraq will result in a better life for Iraqi citizens and will lower the threat of terrorism in the world. If America does not maintain its presence in Iraq until the new gov- ernment is secure, both of our promises will be unful- filled. The whole Arab community — in fact, the entire world — is watching. — John Malas A veteran Army interrogator and Arabic linguist, John Malas was part of a Department of Homeland Security team attached to the 10th Special Forces Group in north- ern Iraq during April and May 2003. He is married to Jennifer Harrison, a Foreign Service secretary currently working in the Diplomatic Courier Office in Frankfurt. A Birthday Celebration I am a retired FSO who served both as a political ana- lyst in State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and as an information management technical specialist in the Bureau of Information Resource Management. Before that, I spent seven years in the Army, and then served as F O C U S 60 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 4 U.S. Marine Vanessa Cardona and her father, retired FSO Herminio Cardona, meet in Camp Doha, Kuwait, in April 2003. Herminio Cardona