THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH-APRIL 2026 15 and could raise First Amendment concerns. The department said it is defending Americans’ free expression from foreign interference and, in a related step, has required H-1B applicants and their dependents to set social media profiles to public for review. Nuclear Safety Rules Secretly Overhauled The Trump administration has quietly rewritten a sweeping set of nuclear safety and security directives at the Department of Energy (DOE), sharing the revised rules with reactor developers while keeping them from public view, according to an investigation by NPR. The changes, made over the fall and winter, cut more than 750 pages from existing requirements governing reactor security, environmental protections, worker safety, and accident investigations, replacing detailed standards with broader, more discretionary guidance. The overhaul is tied to a DOE pilot program aimed at bringing at least three new designs online by July 4 and reflects the administration’s push to fast-track experimental nuclear reactors, particularly small modular reactors. In a statement responding to NPR’s reporting, Union of Concerned Scientists warned that the DOE had taken a “sledgehammer” to core regulatory principles. Edwin Lyman, the group’s director of nuclear power safety, said the changes weaken safeguards developed in response to disasters such as Chernobyl and Fukushima and could extend beyond the pilot program to affect broader nuclear oversight. While DOE officials defend the revisions as streamlining unnecessary regulation and say the directives will be posted publicly later this year, former leaders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and outside experts caution that relaxing standards without transparency could erode public trust and increase risks as the administration accelerates nuclear development to meet growing energy demands, including those tied to artificial intelligence data centers. 2025 SOSA Awardees for Outstanding Volunteerism Abroad The U.S. Foreign Service community is celebrating the 2025 recipients of the Secretary of State Award for Outstanding Volunteerism Abroad (SOSA), presented annually by the Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide (AAFSW). Established in 1990 with the encouragement of then–Secretary of State James A. Baker and his wife, Susan, the SOSA Awards recognize exceptional volunteer service by members of the Foreign Service community serving overseas. Since its inception, the program has honored more than 100 volunteers from over 130 diplomatic missions whose projects demonstrate creativity, leadership, and sustainability—often continuing long after an assignment ends. Awardees are selected by a panel representing AAFSW, the Global Community Liaison Office (GCLO), and State Department regional bureaus, with full profiles published annually in Global Link. Each regional bureau winner receives a $2,500 cash award and a certificate signed by the Secretary of State. Read about them at https://bit .ly/2025-SOSA-honorees. The End of New START On February 5, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expired, ending the last legally binding limits on U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. The treaty capped each side at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers and allowed on-site inspections and data exchanges that built predictability and reduced worst-case assumptions. Its lapse marks the end of a decadeslong era of bilateral arms control. Without binding caps or verification, both countries are free to expand deployments, raising the risk of a renewed arms competition. President Trump has called for negotiating a “better” and more modern treaty. Critics have long argued that New START did not cover nonstrategic nuclear weapons or Russia’s newer “exotic” delivery systems. Meanwhile, Russia has indicated it would consider observing New START’s numerical limits for one year, if the United States reciprocates. Beijing remains reluctant to accept formal limits but may be more open to discussions focused on reducing nuclear risks. Priorities for any new treaty would include bringing back inspections and data exchanges, covering tactical and new types of weapons in future talks, clarifying what is allowed under the nuclear testing pause, and ensuring missile defenses and nuclear forces do not create new instability. With New START’s expiration, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the only legally binding global nuclear restraint. Whether new guardrails can be built will depend on sustained diplomatic engagement. n This issue of Talking Points was compiled by Mark Parkhomenko.
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