24 MARCH-APRIL 2026 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL This ad hoc approach also allowed us to custom design a process that would avoid some of the negotiating pitfalls of traditional United Nations–based procedures. The focus on convening leaders was driven by the recognition that the prescription for improving nuclear security was well understood, but what was lacking was the political will to take hard and often expensive decisions to do it. All leaders understood the need for international cooperation to combat the nuclear terrorism threat—when nuclear weapons material is only as secure as the weakest link, all countries must work together to prevent its theft, detect its illicit transfer, and make sure it is never used in a terrorist weapon. We also recognized that even if these concerns were not top of mind for every attending leader, President Obama’s “star power” would attract their participation and help extract meaningful commitments to increase security at nuclear facilities, reduce quantities of risky materials, build up detection capacity, increase cooperation with allies and neighbors, and take other concrete steps. These pledges became known as “house gifts,” and in many cases, they were the outcome of extensive demarches from U.S. embassies and direct outreach by senior officials to their counterparts to offer technical assistance or simply political encouragement. These diplomatic touch points were evidence of the high priority placed by the U.S. government on achieving real progress on nuclear security. Once the summit guest list was final, we began briefing D.C.-based embassies and attending relevant meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to explain our approach. Many diplomats feared the summit would distract from or compete with the existing multilateral infrastructure involved in preventing nuclear terrorism. But the summit was explicitly designed to enhance, energize, elevate, and empower this complex network of institutions and processes to take meaningful steps to improve security of weapons-usable nuclear materials. This approach demonstrated pragmatism in assembling capable and willing partners to achieve specific outcomes, but also a broader commitment to institution-building, by connecting the can-do spirit of those coalitions to increasing the capacity and stature of associated international organizations. Preparations for the summit were led by “sherpas” and “soussherpas”—terms borrowed from Group of Seven and Group of 20 summit processes that refer to senior officials who could speak authoritatively about their leader’s intent and concerns and who could effectively coordinate inside their government to deliver on leaders’ promises. Many of the sherpa meetings were absorbed with the mechanics of the summit itself: who would speak when, delegation size, seating arrangements. As the U.S. sous-sherpa, I led meetings with my counterparts that focused on the substance of a consensus communique, on identifying national pledges, and on topical briefings to create a common set of understandings about the threat of nuclear terrorism and the tools necessary to manage it. The initial Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C., in 2010, was followed by summits in Seoul (2012) and The Hague (2014). A decade ago, the U.S. hosted the final summit in this format. Securing Nuclear Materials The key to preventing nuclear terrorism is to keep the nuclear materials out of the hands of those who could use them for deadly harm. Securing nuclear materials includes a wide range of activities, from shrinking overall quantities to reducing locations where they are stored or used and increasing physical protection around these materials and facilities. It also involves monitoring staff for The author (center) introduces her friend and sherpa team colleague Corey Hinderstein to President Barack Obama at the National Security Summit in Washington, D.C., in March 2016. COURTESY OF LAURA HOLGATE
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