THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH-APRIL 2026 25 found that the convention’s adherents more than tripled during the period of the Nuclear Security Summits, significantly strengthening the criminalization of nuclear theft, trafficking, and sabotage. • IAEA, which has a central role among multilateral institutions on nuclear security, saw its nuclear security office elevated in status and its funding consistently increased based on summit pledges. • In 2011, IAEA published its first update of nuclear security guidelines since 9/11 and is currently conducting a second update. More and more countries requested peer reviews of their Hundreds of tons of uranium and plutonium exist in 22 countries, whether in weapons programs or as part of civilian nuclear energy fuel cycles or research facilities. insider threats, detecting and recovering stolen materials, determining the origin of intercepted nuclear materials or devices, and prosecuting those involved in nuclear theft or use. At the heart of the summits’ purpose was the strengthening of the structures that guide and support states in implementing their sovereign responsibility to secure their nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities against theft, diversion, or, worst of all, use. These structures include the United Nations (UN), the IAEA, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and several treaties and initiatives involving government officials, nuclear industry, and civil society. Summit communiques and national commitments emphasized the strengthening of these components of the global nuclear security architecture. For example: • The summits contributed to the 10-year extension, in 2011, of the only global, binding requirement that states secure their nuclear material: UN Security Council Resolution 1540, originally adopted in 2004. • The UN, which also serves as depository for the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terror,
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