40 MARCH-APRIL 2026 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Of greater concern, however, was the substance of the president’s social media message: The United States would resume nuclear testing. Similarly, the announcement instructed the Department of War [sic] to prepare for a test, but the maintenance—and potential testing—of nuclear weapons is the responsibility of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Of greater concern, however, was the substance of the president’s social media message: The United States would resume nuclear testing. This was largely interpreted as a reference to nuclear explosive testing. The United States has not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992, when it declared a formal moratorium; since 1998, only North Korea has done so, in 2017, almost a decade ago. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear explosive testing, was opened for signature in 1996, but has not yet entered into force because key states, including the United States, have not ratified it. Yet it has played an important role in creating a norm against such testing and in building an international monitoring system. Some have suggested that the president’s announcement should be read as a call for testing of nuclear delivery systems, the missiles and aircraft that carry nuclear bombs and warheads. The announcement referred to other countries’ testing programs, and indeed Russia had tested new types of nuclear delivery systems in the preceding weeks. U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright sought to allay concerns with this explanation: “I think the tests we’re talking about right now are systems tests. These are not nuclear explosions. These are what we call noncritical explosions.” Secretary Wright went on to note that these tests would involve “the other parts of a nuclear weapon” rather than the nuclear explosive itself. Despite these reassurances, exactly what the administration has in mind remains unclear. The benefits of resumed nuclear explosive testing are marginal, but the costs are clear: it would add significant instability to today’s already precarious security environment. This is not 1996, when many countries were cooperating to reduce nuclear threats. It’s a very different, and more competitive, world. What’s at Stake? Of all the countries that possess nuclear weapons, the United States has the least to gain and the most to lose by a resumption of nuclear explosive testing. Russia has conducted fewer, and China far fewer, nuclear tests than the United States, and both countries have far more to gain from renewed nuclear explosive testing. For decades, the United States has sustained an extensive science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program that ensures the reliability, safety, security, and effectiveness of its nuclear stockpile through advanced, highly sophisticated science and engineering programs. It encompasses multiple efforts across all NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites, including the NNSA nuclear weapons laboratories (Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore). This program ensures that the United States maintains a safe and effective nuclear deterrent without nuclear explosive testing. Every year, the directors of the nuclear weapons labs are required by Congress to certify that the program is meeting its objectives. This has occurred without fail since 1996. The certification was last completed on September 22, 2025, just a few weeks before the president’s post. If something changed radically in the few weeks between the certification and the announcement, it would be a pretty big surprise (especially to the lab directors). “Because of other countries’ testing programs,” the president’s post read, the United States would resume testing of our nuclear weapons “on an equal basis.” The reference to other countries seems to point to a 2021 report in which the State Department concluded that Russia, and possibly China, had conducted very low-yield nuclear tests that (unlike the subcritical tests Secretary Wright referred to) are inconsistent with the zero-yield standard set by the CTBT. A State Department official stated in February 2026 that China had conducted such low-yield tests. According to former NNSA Administrator (and former Sandia National Laboratories Director) Jill Hruby, such low-yield tests would provide additional information but are not needed for stockpile stewardship. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to the Trump post in early November, stating that Russia would take “reciprocal measures,” and has reportedly asked his security council
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy ODIyMDU=