THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH-APRIL 2026 41 to draft options to resume such testing. Moscow had withdrawn its ratification of the CTBT in 2023, saying it sought the same status as the United States, but stated at the time that it would not resume testing unless the United States did so first. The Wrong Signal If the United States breaks its own moratorium, it sends a clear signal not just to Russia and China but also to other countries that testing could be a tenable option. India and Pakistan last conducted explosive testing in 1998 and have maintained test moratoria since then, but a resumption of U.S. testing would reduce constraints they may have with respect to a resumption of testing. This is an already volatile region, and the prospect of new nuclear arms racing, not just in South Asia but potentially in China as well, is not something the United States should encourage. Though North Korea has not tested since 2017, the country remains ready to test. It does not have a formal, declared moratorium but has exercised some restraint in the past, and the United States has nothing to gain by opening the door to a resumed testing program. More broadly, nuclear explosive testing would send exactly the wrong signal to the international community about the U.S. commitment to widely shared nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament objectives. Halting nuclear testing has long been a critical goal of efforts to prevent nuclear war and nuclear proliferation. The first multilateral disarmament treaty was the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited nuclear testing everywhere except underground and, in its preamble, expressed the goal of ending all nuclear tests. The NPT Under Pressure Nuclear explosive testing is a key step for any country seeking a nuclear weapon. Indeed, China’s first nuclear test in 1964 was one of the factors that galvanized the international community to negotiate the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, initially for 25 years. The NPT recognizes five countries—the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China—as nuclear-weapon states; all others joined the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, committing not to pursue a nuclear weapon. NPT parties committed to pursue good-faith negotiations to end the arms race and toward nuclear disarmament. The NPT preamble calls for “the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,” which all parties recognized to be an essential step for both nonproliferation and arms control. And when the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995, the parties adopted the objective of completing CTBT negotiations in 1996. This commitment from the nuclear-weapon states to prioritize completion of the CTBT helped to secure the indefinite extension of the NPT. But the NPT is already under pressure. Many non-nuclear states are frustrated with the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and with the modernization and expansion of some countries’ nuclear arsenals. Iran has threatened to withdraw from the NPT over the reimposition of United Nations sanctions. Saudi Arabia has said it intends to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does, and others in the Middle East could follow suit. Politicians and advocates in South Korea, Germany, and Poland have questioned the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and advocated for or entertained the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. A Prudent Approach In short, the United States has little, if anything, to gain from resuming nuclear testing and much to lose if it does so. It would represent an abdication of U.S. leadership in nuclear nonproliferation and undercut long-standing U.S. commitments to nuclear restraint. It would open the door for others to follow suit in ways that increase risks of nuclear competition and confrontation around the globe. Rather than adding to the pressures on the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the United States should be reaffirming and reinforcing its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Secretary Wright’s formula represents a prudent approach that would enable the United States to maintain its nuclear stockpile to the highest technical standards, thereby maintaining a safe and effective nuclear deterrent. It is a sensible approach to clarifying the president’s intentions and would not undercut our long-standing leadership in advancing global nuclear nonproliferation objectives. n The United States has little, if anything, to gain from resuming nuclear testing and much to lose if it does so.
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