80 MARCH-APRIL 2026 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL U.S. Foreign Policy in Action The section focused on illustrative examples of U.S. foreign policy in action makes up most of the book. Ross correctly gives the George H.W. Bush administration high marks for how it managed German reunification. He explains how the administration “developed a clear objective” and “moved quickly to gain control of the agenda.” Condoleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow’s Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (1995), a must-read on the subject, makes many similar points. Ross expertly conveys the confusion that initially beset Washington as it wrestled with the consequences of the breakup of Yugoslavia. He describes how Richard Holbrooke took control of U.S. policy and orchestrated the Dayton Accords in 1995. As the author relates, “The marriage of force and diplomacy was carried out masterfully.” He also cites Holbrooke’s memoir, To End a War (1998), which paints a vivid portrait of the Bosnia endgame. With the good comes the bad, and the U.S. government has sometimes charted the wrong course while making other errors in judgment. In this respect, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 remains an object lesson in the risks of groupthink and inadequate contingency planning. Ross’ overall appraisal is stark but on target: “It would have been hard to practice statecraft more poorly than the George W. Bush administration did in going to war in Iraq.” He sensibly supports enhancing ties with governments that share U.S. concerns about China. While emphasizing that much will depend on Beijing’s attitude, he makes a compelling case that we need to keep the door open to engagement. Statecraft 2.0 is at its best when Ross details how he and other American negotiators worked closely with foreign counterparts in resolving knotty problems. He convincingly advocates the use of diplomatic back channels because they “permit the introduction of ideas or testing of possibilities in a way that formal talks simply preclude.” Ambassador William J. Burns’ magisterial 2019 work, The Back Channel, is full of insightful examples of the type of creative and assertive diplomacy favored by Ross. Unfortunately, Statecraft 2.0 has a textbook-like quality. The author tries to enliven the narrative with anecdotes, but the prose is still a bit dry at times. Having said that, it is well worth the effort. Ross has decades of firsthand experience in foreign affairs, and his voice is an authoritative one. His latest work presents a masterclass in how lessons drawn from the past can inform present-day policymakers and practitioners. n Joseph L. Novak is a writer based in Washington, D.C. He is a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society in London and a retiree member of the American Foreign Service Association. A former lawyer, he was a Foreign Service officer for 30 years. As a former top diplomat, Ross understands that U.S. foreign policy is not made in a vacuum. On the positive side of the ledger, the Bush administration began to ask hard questions. This led to the surge, i.e., the deployment of more troops to Iraq in 2007. It was a difficult decision to make, but the move helped stabilize the situation. Ross is right to emphasize how “the objective and means were in sync.” In Ross’ astute telling, Syria was another instance where U.S. policymakers were not up to the task at hand. In the wake of the Iraq quagmire, the Obama administration did not want to intervene in the civil war. With Washington stuck in neutral, Russia intervened in support of the Assad regime, and the refugee problem metastasized, sparking a backlash in Europe. Statecraft 2.0 was in publication when insurgents suddenly toppled the regime in December 2024. Ross also probes the U.S.-led intervention in Libya. The Obama administration initially claimed that the aim was “to save the Libyan civilian population,” but the reality was more complex. With the downfall of the Qaddafi regime in late 2011, the United States disengaged while Libya’s internal power struggle ramped up. Ross, an adviser to President Obama at the time, believes that the U.S. government could have done more to avert the turmoil. The Value of Back Channels The chapter on how to deal with China’s expanding influence is persuasively written. The author notes the limits of the Cold War analogy, commenting: “The Soviets were a military threat but never an economic competitor.”
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