The Foreign Service Journal, March 2005

ers in the reconstruction effort. They are supporting a political process that is dangerous and marks an uncertain start on the road to greater political legitimacy and stability. At worst, the elections may bring a new tyranny to power and greatly complicate U.S. efforts to fight terror in Iraq and else- where. In the short term, greater security, basic services and jobs are more important for most Iraqis than notions of democracy. In summary, there are no silver bullets. We only mislead Iraqis and ourselves by plac- ing too much weight on individual events. Realistic Objectives Instead of building utopian sandcastles, the U.S. should embrace modest but achievable expectations for Iraq. It is still possible to help Iraqis make their coun- try a better place for their children and a much safer place for Iraq’s neighbors, and it is imperative that we prevent Iraq from becoming the imminent danger to the U.S. that some argued it was at the beginning of the Bush administration. Viewed another way, a realistic policy needs redlines for really dan- gerous Iraqi behavior, as distinct from behavior that is merely disap- pointing or annoying. The good news is that the Bush administration has, in fact, been moving in this direction on the ground, even while the rhetorical exuberance of the president and vice president in the last election campaign, and more recently the president’s State of the Union address, remained stuck in the time warp of the imme- diate postwar euphoria. As nearly as this outsider can tell, the key goals of F O C U S M A R C H 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 29 Except for a very few insurgency leaders, the failure to vote was not because particular classes of Iraqis “don’t want democracy.”