The Foreign Service Journal, March 2005

the emerging, non-rhetorical policy are as follows: First: Iraqi cooperation in the war against terrorists bent on violence against Americans and our de facto allies in the governments of the region. Iraq was a theoretical safe haven for such terrorists before we invaded. Now it is much more likely to become a real one if a working rela- tionship between governments in Washington and Baghdad were to collapse or, worse, if Iraq were to con- tinue its slide into the failed-state category. Second: Strict Iraqi adherence to U.N. resolutions prohibiting future efforts to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction or long-range missile programs. If the new Iraqi political order fails to cooperate on those two points, they will have crossed redlines that I believe would be intolerable for any U.S. administration. These are not matters for partisan controversy. They are fundamental objectives for our national security. There are two other objectives which are achiev- able, as well as necessary to sustain an Iraqi govern- ment that could deliver on the two primary American goals. The first is stabilization of Iraq under a consti- tutionally chosen leadership in order to ensure that it not become a breeding ground for a new generation of terrorist groups and a center for the recruitment of desperate and bitter young people. The immediate results of elections are less important than consensus- building and bargaining among Iraqi factions within a framework influenced by elections but not isolated from Iraqi political realities. The Transitional Administrative Law was designed to protect individuals by a bill of rights and minorities by a high degree of federalism. This “temporary constitution” avoided making Iraqi politics a zero-sum game. The United Iraqi Alliance — comprising major Shi’a Islamist parties, along with some secular Shi’as, notably Hussain Shahristani and Ahmed Chalabi, and a smat- tering of Kurds and Sunnis of no great reputation — may well have an absolute majority in the National Assembly, but this electoral list does not enjoy a nation- al consensus to govern Iraq. It will require skillful compromises and political management to avoid excluding credible Kurdish and Sunni Arab representa- tives in the resulting institutions of government. Failure would be a recipe for continued insurgency and eventual civil war. Elected Iraqi leaders might turn out to show restraint and be capable negotiators, but they will need much support from the United States and other members of the international community, includ- ing a strong role for the United Nations. The second objective necessary to sustain the new Iraqi government is economic reconstruction that gen- erates employment, delivers basic services and puts Iraqi oil production on a sound basis for gradual growth. Prior to Iraqi sovereignty in June, the U.S. used Iraqi funds for major infrastructure projects, usu- ally awarding contracts to American firms and creating few local jobs. Now that we are starting to move more of the $18-billion-plus U.S. aid program into the pipeline, we need to do better. Hopefully, most of the new Cabinet members, like the members of the Interim Iraqi Government, will be capable technocrats who can deliver, if they get basic security and funding. Promises vs. Reality It is worth reviewing how the U.S. got to where it now finds itself in Iraq. A decade of close American relationships with Iraqi opposition leaders failed both to unite them in exile and to extend their meaningful influence into the non-Kurdish parts of the country. The time was not wasted by the opposition, however. They became experts on U.S. domestic politics and honed their lobbying skills. The disparity between their claims and their capabilities did not escape the professionals in the State Department, CIA and Central Command. Some opposition leaders succeed- ed, nevertheless, in end-running the experts in the U.S. government and establishing strongholds in Congress, among out-of-office Republican leaders, think-tanks and the media. When the Bush administration came to office, some high officials were already convinced that the inability of the Clinton administration to make con- tainment more effective and to ultimately force politi- cal change in Baghdad was due to a combination of lack of strategic imagination, political timidity and bureau- cratic investment in the status quo. Transition briefings and a continuing flow of reports did not change that mind-set. To some degree, it just confirmed the Iraqi opposition’s complaints about the career officials. In retrospect, this should not have been surprising. Two assignments in Baghdad impressed me with the depth of creativity and resilience of the Iraqi people. It made me admire a nation that could continue to pro- duce talented elites, a burgeoning middle class and a disciplined rank-and-file despite the stultifying effects F O C U S 30 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 5