The Foreign Service Journal, March 2005

some of the problems worse during the period of occu- pation, and they have not notably improved during the tenure of the Iraqi Interim Government. The verdict is still out for the officials of the new transitional govern- ment, but they face challenges much greater than the recent election. As a failed state, Iraq would rapidly become a black hole for efforts to fight international ter- rorism and proliferation of nasty weapons. So far, there is no sign that the U.S. will cut and run, but there is a longer-term danger that we will walk away too quickly. Some people will be tempted to spin a set- back for American strategic interests and misery for the Iraqi people into something that looks like a foreign pol- icy success and, therefore, a domestic political success for either the current administration or the next one. The dilemma of John Kerry and other mainstream Democratic Party leaders in the primary and general election campaigns was painful to watch. Resisting strong temptations to resort to populist demagoguery, they were unable to exploit the setbacks in Iraq for benefit at the polls. Political pundits may argue that this cost Kerry and Edwards the election, but the American people benefited from their restraint. At this point, there is still a fragile consensus among old fash- ioned Republican conservative internationalists, Democratic internationalists and responsible elements of the U.S. media that we must not forget the dangers to our national interests of unfinished business in Iraq, even if the neo-conservative and aggressive Wilsonian dreams for Iraq are now clearly out of reach. Hopefully, we have entered a period where realism will get new respect in Washington. We need to face up to hard facts and not rely on the comforting illusions still reflected in much of the assertive White House rhetoric that passes for public diplomacy. A Wish List To Forget There is a long list of things that Washington had in mind for Iraq that will be unattainable, at least in the near term. If we are wise, we will swallow our disap- pointment and be ready to accept compromises, even if they often seem cynical. The Iraqis will do many things that make us unhappy, even if they do not cross our redlines. We should expect, for example, that Iraqi for- eign policy will be within the Arab consensus regarding the Palestine issue, and we should not be surprised if Baghdad also supports the Syrian demand for full with- drawal of Israel from the occupied Golan. Many Americans will probably be uncomfortable with the role that Iraqi leaders give to Islam in social and edu- cational affairs. But we need to accept that an Iraqi consensus on this point is far more important than some model the U.S. might prefer. In dealing with economic matters, it would be sur- prising if the unbridled free-market, low-tax and low- tariff models the Bush administration prefers prevail in Iraq. My own prediction is that with much carping from second-guessers in Washington, the White House and the State Department and the Congress will adjust to the emerging realities. After all, Pakistan is now called a “major non-NATO ally,” a step that few of us would have predicted in the summer of 2001. The events of 9/11 changed our priorities toward Pakistan, and the realities of the war on terrorism must affect our policy toward Iraq. We had better hope that current trends in U.S. pol- icy are successful. There are some administration offi- cials, members of Congress and influential think-tanks all too ready to say that Bremer, Negroponte and the State Department sabotaged the policy of President Bush and “lost Iraq.” As if Iraq was ever ours to lose. Nearly two years after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, far too many Iraqis say their daily lives were better off before that event. If this belief remains widespread after three years, it will be a historic polit- ical defeat with implications extending far beyond the borders of Iraq. We must not keep our military forces in permanent occupation on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates because someone has decided we are the new Roman Empire and should act accordingly. We must not fritter away our multibillion-dollar aid program in ways that largely serve pet economic theories, the interests of a few American corporations and a relatively small number of favored Iraqi partners. We should raise our sights beyond the old toler- ance for an autocratic Iraqi government that is tem- porarily serving U.S. interests, but we should also be realistic in how we define the process of democratiza- tion. The key building blocks for democracy are basic security, the rule of law and institutions of civil soci- ety. Here is where it is most important that we do not promise too much but help meet those needs that Iraqis themselves identify. n F O C U S 36 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 5