The Foreign Service Journal, March 2005

In return, however, Canadian Foreign Service officers enjoy far greater job security than their American counterparts. Once over the mid-level “threshold,” Canadian diplomats do not face any barriers to an extended career. There is no “time in class,” no “up or out” requirement to enter the Senior Foreign Service, and no selection-out or low-ranking. Furthermore, unlike the American system, Canadian human rights legis- lation prevents compulsory retire- ment because of age or length of employment. To be sure, a diplomat can be terminated for cause, but such removals generally imply criminality rather than incompetence. In regard to assignments, most Canadian diplomats are expected to spend about 60 percent of their time overseas, but (as is the case for U.S. diplomats) the system does take into account spousal and health issues in making assignments. As a result, per- sonnel from outside the Foreign Service frequently fill overseas slots, which has generated another set of morale problems. To help address overseas staffing, there are reportedly plans to implement a “lateral entry” procedure to bring in officers at the mid-level without the stringent vet- ting that new hires undergo. Executive Service. In any orga- nization, particularly one based on demonstration of merit in competi- tion against one’s peers, those who have made it to the top believe that the system works fine — after all, they are “the proof of the pudding.” The Canadian Foreign Service is cer- tainly no exception to this principle. While senior diplomats may some- times feel aggrieved about particular assignments, they generally have little sympathy for calls from below for sys- temic change. They do, however, object strongly to the comprehensive reorganization the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is cur- rently undergoing. In particular, they regard the division between trade and foreign affairs (see “An Uncertain Future” below for details) as wrong- headed. Some oppose the restructur- ing mainly because they believe it will cost them senior positions, while oth- ers are concerned that it will weaken Canada’s diplomatic clout, turning it from a middle to a “muddle” power. However, their cries have fallen on deaf ears. Minorities/Women. For Cana- dians, the most important minority has always been French-speakers in the province of Quebec (“Que- becois”), who make up approximately a quarter of the population. Although the earliest tranche of diplomats was predominantly English-speaking, by the 1950s, Francophones were well represented, constituting 36 of the 137 diplomats recruited between 1949 and 1957. During the 1960s, some two-thirds of successful Francophone candidates declined offers to join the Foreign Service, pre- sumably due to better (or more time- ly) job proposals. However, it appears that this is no longer a concern. The first woman officer in the Canadian diplomatic service did not enter until 1947; up to 1971, married women had to resign, and recruit- ment of women was sporadic. For example, between 1949 and 1957, 137 new officers joined, but only six were women. Although five women joined in 1976, there was none in the two years before or after that group. Currently, however, the entering class ratios are closer to 50-50 and are expected to remain at rough parity. Political and Other Non- Career Appointees. Canadian diplomats echo the concerns of their U.S. colleagues over political appoin- tees in senior diplomatic positions. But in real terms, they have virtually nothing to complain about. Follow- ing the initial years of the Foreign Service when, as was the case for the United States, all overseas appoint- 46 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 5