The Foreign Service Journal, March 2005

waterhouseCoopers review of com- parative wage compensation packages (minus overseas compensation) rated Canada 12th of 16 countries, includ- ing the United States and the U.K. (In addition, comparing the various professional groups within the Canadian Foreign Service, PAFSO rates diplomats as “among the lowest paid.”) As noted above, the structure of the personnel system ensures that pro- motions will be few and far between. So instead of examining all members of the class for possible entry into the Executive Service, Canadians attempt to limit the group under consideration each year by administering a written examination. In 2004, candidates had to pass a four-question essay test made up of theoretical questions; even the most glowing performance appraisals were irrelevant unless the candidate passed this textbook-oriented exam. One of the four questions did not test what it purported to cover, however, so those who failed that portion of the exam were allowed to take it again. Those who were successful on the sec- ond try were allowed to take the oral, joining those who had initially passed the exam (despite the flawed parame- ters). Nevertheless, the experience left diplomats frustrated with the sys- tem. The United States Is Canada’s Primary Problem While no U.S. leader goes to sleep worried about developments in Ottawa, such is not the case for Canadians regarding Washington. A decade ago a government “white paper” addressing Canadian foreign policy identified its principal interna- tional challenge as managing bilateral relations with the United States — that is, managing the relationship to Canada’s (not mutual) benefit. Nor was the objective to have “good” rela- tions, because that might suggest sub- servience to Washington. Instead, Canada has traditionally sought to avoid one-on-one confronta- tion with the United States. If we are the world’s 800-pound gorilla, then Canada qualifies as an 80-pound chimpanzee: smart, but no match for a larger opponent. Accordingly, rather than a wrestling match with Washington, Ottawa wants to charm it into pursuing common objectives — or at least to avoid its wrath. This process has become increasingly diffi- cult for Canadian diplomats in the past few years, however, as the Internet has made Bush administration offi- cials aware of the strident anti- Americanism now prevalent in main- line Canadian media. Or, to put it another way: Canada views itself as a “middle power” that can “punch above its weight” with adroit diplomacy and, in the past, a small, but highly competent military particularly effective at “peacekeep- ing.” Canada persistently seeks rule- based multilateral forums where clever legalisms are able to negate massive economic, even military, power. Pursuing national objectives, it has joined virtually every international organization around, is a strong sup- porter of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and works assiduously on economic differ- ences through World Trade Organi- zation and NAFTA appeal panels. To address its bilateral concerns with the United States, Ottawa main- tains its largest embassy in Washington — and staffs it with an “A Team.” Canadian diplomats, including recent- ly departed Ambassador Michael Kergin, frequently have served multi- ple tours in Washington or covered U.S.-related topics in Ottawa, qualify- ing them as “American handlers.” The current Canadian ambassador is a rare exception to the pattern of career appointments to Washington. Amb- assador Frank McKenna, a former premier of New Brunswick, is more in the U.S. tradition of appointing a for- mer governor (e.g., James Blanchard or Paul Celucci), to our embassy in Ottawa. McKenna, a senior member of the Liberal Party, has a close per- sonal relationship with Prime Minister Paul Martin and at least a nodding familiarity with senior offi- cials in the Bush administration. Needless to say, we do not devote reciprocal attention to Canada. While, at 350 personnel, our embassy in Ottawa is large, and without question, our diplomatic representatives are able and active, we have not created a cadre of Canada specialists equivalent to those with career paths directed toward China, Japan, Russia or Arabic-speaking countries. An Uncertain Future While the longstanding trauma for the U.S. Foreign Service has been the McCarthy era of the 1950s and the related issue of dissent (e.g., Vietnam, former Yugoslavia, Iraq), the Cana- dian Foreign Service has endured nothing comparable. To be sure, there were security-related problems in the 1950s, resulting in what has been described as a purge that partic- ularly targeted suspected homosexu- als, but Canada’s level of domestic and/or internal controversy over its diplomats’ political or personal orien- tation has not matched that of the U.S. Probably more important, howev- er, was the disrespect that the long- ruling, iconic Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau directed toward the Foreign Service (akin perhaps to JFK describ- ing the State Department as a bowl of jelly). In 1969 Trudeau suggested the extant version of diplomacy was “outmoded” and that foreign affairs topics could be read in a “good news- paper.” A decade later, Trudeau reit- erated his view that instant global communication and personal con- tact between world leaders had reduced the relevance of traditional diplomacy. Moreover, despite having elected 48 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 5