The Foreign Service Journal, March 2005

M A R C H 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 51 ast October, the third National Summit on Cuba was held in Tampa, Fla. Once again, those advocating abandoning policies and sanctions that have clearly failed to lead to political change in Cuba for more than 40 years faced those who argue for ever-tighter and more onerous sanctions to counter the human rights abuses and oppression of Fidel Castro’s regime. This is a dance with unique steps that is peculiar to Florida, but one that is particularly popular with both Democratic and Re- publican presidential candidates in election years. It is also a dance that highlights the misplaced focus of U.S. sanctions policy in an era of global terrorism. A Question of Credibility The Cuban embargo is often cited abroad as a prime example of a U.S. unilateral economic sanctions program that has clearly failed to achieve its stated aims, and is now maintained purely for domestic political purposes (while costing American exporters an estimated $3-4 billion annually). The embar- go’s extraterritorial application to ostensibly control the deal- ings of foreign commercial entities and transactions well removed from Cuba and Castro’s government is a cause of friction with our nation’s trading partners. And the periodic efforts to extend and tighten the controls’ extraterritorial impact overseas, such as the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, are perceived as an affront to the sovereignty of our trad- ing partners and undermine the cred- ibility abroad of the U.S. sanctions programs generally — and not just with regard to Cuba. U.S. insistence on applying these measures in third countries is prob- lematic under international law and has prompted several foreign govern- ments, along with the European Union, to pass laws prohibiting their nationals and companies from com- plying with the terms of the U.S. embargo. Ironically, these foreign “blocking measures” are partially pat- terned after the United States’s own anti-boycott laws, prohibitions that are aimed at countering the extraterritorial application of the Arab League boycott of Israel to American nationals and companies. It’s one thing for the United States to declare that its cit- izens, residents and companies will not deal directly with a particular sanctions target, such as Cuba, but it’s altogether another thing — both politically and under international law T HE C UBAN T HISTLE C RISIS : R ETHINKING U.S. S ANCTIONS T HE C UBAN EMBARGO IS OFTEN CITED ABROAD AS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF A U.S. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS PROGRAM THAT HAS CLEARLY FAILED TO ACHIEVE ITS STATED AIMS , AND IS NOW MAINTAINED PURELY FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL PURPOSES . B Y P ETER L. F ITZGERALD Peter L. Fitzgerald is a professor of law at the Stetson University College of Law in Florida, and a recent Fulbright Distinguished Scholar to the United Kingdom. He also serves on the International Advisory Board of SanctionsWatch.com. L The efforts to tighten the controls’ extraterritorial impact overseas are perceived as an affront to the sovereignty of our trading partners.