The Foreign Service Journal, March 2006

F O C U S M A R C H 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 31 protection except Foreign Service employees,” writes an FSO currently serving in Baghdad. “Many of these people never leave the compound. I, on the other hand, am required to move around the Green Zone to attend meetings. When my senior colleagues or mili- tary counterparts arrive at these meetings, they are accompanied by Personal Security Details who deliver them in armored vehicles to the door of the building and escort them to their meetings. I arrive in a soft car, am required to park hundreds of yards away and get myself into the meeting. I also visit sites in the field and travel into the Red Zone in Baghdad. … Foreign Service employees who feel comfortable with firearms and are qualified to use them should be allowed to carry them when off-compound.” Many positions in Iraq have been and continue to be filled by non-career appointees, contractors and detailees from outside the Foreign Service. What has been the impact of this? Out of some 2,000-plus people working on the U.S. embassy compound in Baghdad, fewer than 200 are career Foreign Service. Of course, at many embassies State and the other foreign affairs agencies are a minor- ity compared to the other federal agencies represented, but there is no other embassy in the world that is host to so many non-Foreign Service employees, political appointees and contractors. According to the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, there are about 155 employees currently in Iraq serving in “3161” positions working for the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. (Under 5 USC 3161, the authori- ty was established to create and staff temporary organi- zations such as IRMO.) Some 3161s are retired U.S. government personnel, but most have not had prior overseas or U.S. govern- ment experience. Some of them come with political backgrounds from campaigns. IRMO is also staffed by U.S. government personnel on detail from other agen- cies, active-duty military and contractors. Comments on the impact of the large number of non- FS staff working in Iraq were mixed, but most were neg- ative. By far the biggest concern was that most of the appointees, contractors and detailees lack the under- standing of how an embassy functions and the way U.S. policy work is coordinated. Some respondents did express appreciation for the specific skills brought in by outsiders. “Frankly, I think a lot of the political appointees were disasters,” writes an officer who served in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. “They seemed to be ideologues rather than diplomats. A lot of the contrac- tors and other detailees I met seemed quite capable.” “Seasoned professional FSOs bring skill and knowl- edge to the table that others do not have, no matter how much substantive knowledge they may have on specific matters,” comments an FSO serving in Baghdad. “The high concentration of non-Foreign Service staff in Baghdad in significant positions serves to 1) undermine the influence of State vis-à-vis the mil- itary, as many of the [non-FS] State interlocutors are not seen by the military as qualified; and 2) undermine State’s ability to conduct business in Iraq according to Foreign Service norms.” “Policy is being made in some cases by 3161s or con- tractors with minimal appreciation for larger foreign pol- icy goals, minimal experience to judge how best to accomplish them, and ineptness in how to structure or manage bureaucracies to produce what is wanted,” writes an officer from a regional embassy office. “3161s with no background in civilian U.S. government operations often look down on FSOs (or other federal/civilian employees) and ignore their input.” “The non-career appointees and contractors who fill these positions are a detriment to the U.S. mission in Iraq,” says one officer serving in Baghdad, “because they lack the basic diplomatic skills necessary to develop strong bilateral ties with the Iraqi government. In many instances they are experts in one field, yet more often than not they lack the necessary basic interpersonal skills … treating Iraqi government officials as if they worked for the contractors. …. These non-career appointees will often make statements on other issues outside their lane that cause confusion and problems that the mission is then forced to clean up.” “The 3161s are the bane of our existence,” says a diplomatic security agent who recently served in Baghdad. “For the most part, they have no clue how an embassy runs, still think and act like they are in the pri- vate sector and can do as they like, and have no concept of how or why to protect classified information.” An FSO serving in Baghdad writes that the non-FS employees “make it much more difficult because they