The Foreign Service Journal, March 2006

his approach to us, my experience so far in Iraq and with the CPA offered little encouragement that we would be able to establish any meaningful partnership. But both of us said the right things and agreed to meet again. Within days of our meeting, the entire landscape in Iraq worsened dramatically. The first eruption was in Sadr City, where the lst CAV took and inflicted heavy casualties on the Mesh Mehdi of Mouktada al Sadr. Fighting quickly spread to south-central Iraq and enveloped dozens of towns, resulting in the Coalition’s loss of control and evacua- tions of CPA personnel. Falluja and other towns in the “Sunni Triangle” became strongholds of the insur- gents. Coalition supply convoys were attacked in dramatic fashion, and deliveries of food, water, ammunition and fuel slowed. U.S. casualties soared. Most expatriate contractors evacuated to Kuwait or Jordan, waiting to see if conditions would permit their return. No area of Baghdad was even marginally safe, and the 1st CAV was heavily engaged in fighting. All of this had signifi- cant impact on USAID operations and the safety of our personnel; and I had little time to think of the offered partnership with Gen. Chiarelli. Then, in mid-April 2004, I received an invitation to a dinner at the Bechtel compound, in honor of the 1st CAV commander. With over $1 billion in USAID con- struction contracts, many in Baghdad, Bechtel was one of our most important partners and depended on the 1st CAV to maintain a relatively permissive environ- ment. Accompanying Gen. Chiarelli were several of his senior staff, most notably his Engineer Brigade commander, Colonel Kendall Cox. Seize the Moment As was his custom, Bechtel chief-of-party Cliff Mumm began the dinner with a slide presentation of Bechtel’s program, which consisted primarily of large infrastructure projects. At about the fourth slide, Gen. Chiarelli interrupted the presentation. He said (I para- phrase): “Just stop. Look, I know that Bechtel is an excellent company and I am sure that the things you are doing are worthwhile. But you are never going to complete them unless I can get the sewage off the streets of Sadr City and get potable water into the houses of the people who live on those streets — because, unless that happens fast, I am going to be run out of Baghdad and will not be able to protect you.” There was stunned silence around the table. Gen. Chiarelli then asked if he could put up some of his own slides to explain what he thought was needed. During the next half-hour, he and Col. Cox described a program that would concentrate on projects to install water and sewer pipe; restore electricity; remove and landfill solid waste; generate short-term employment; and immediately improve the lives of the population of eastern Baghdad. He asked if some of the funds that were slated for large infrastruc- ture projects in Baghdad could be redirected to elec- tricity distribution, water distribution and sewage col- lection. The central thrust of his plan was that we needed to quickly demonstrate to the communities that we were engaged and that the condition of their lives was going to improve. Unfortunately, the perception of the aver- age Iraqi in 2004, one year after the end of major com- bat operations, was that nothing was being done. That perception aided the insurgency. It was a studied and cogent presentation, describing a tactical approach that matched my own views about what we should be doing. My only reservation was that there had been no discussion of community participa- tion, something we knew was critical to success. When I raised this, his entire staff practically shouted, “We have it,” explaining that all of the activities described had been either requested or vetted by Neighborhood Advisory Councils and District Advisory Councils. My infrastructure lead Tom Wheelock, Cliff Mumm and I looked at each other across the table and nodded — we could do this. In the days that followed, Gen. Chiarelli and I met and expanded his plan to incorporate other programs that we could tailor to our mutual needs, including pri- vate-sector development programs designed to create economic growth and long-term employment. For his part, Gen. Chiarelli made available helicopters and fer- F O C U S M A R C H 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 57 The real key was the fact that Gen. Chiarelli and I had a shared vision of what was needed in Baghdad.