The Foreign Service Journal, March 2006

ried our staff to the brigade com- bat teams to meet with the com- manders and civil affairs staff. I impressed upon my staff — many of whom had reservations about working closely with the military and had expressed that their partners also held strong views on the subject — the need to help the 1st CAV and thus help ourselves by seizing the moment. The obvious strategic importance of Baghdad justified such a con- centrated effort. We delegated design and implementation responsibility to teams working on var- ious aspects of the program. The infrastructure team had identified $162 million of unfunded needs in water, sewage and electricity distribution. Funding the requirement would involve getting CPA approval to cut something else out of the 2207, and that meant obtain- ing the broad consensus previously described. It was my judgment that the only way consensus would ever be obtained was if Amb. Bremer basically directed that it happen; and I suggested to the general that he and I approach the ambassador directly. We met with Amb. Bremer in early May. He enthusiastically supported our plans, directing the Project Management Office to identify the funding. Development Fund for Iraq monies (seized funds and Oil For Food) was made available to establish a visible presence in a few “strategic cities.” But it was not until the transition to State Department control in July 2004 that a serious realignment of priorities was undertaken. The 1st CAV Model In the meantime, we brought both the PMO and the Army Corps of Engineers into the program. Gen. Chiarelli initiated and chaired a weekly briefing, with all parties present, to track progress and deal with problems. There was the inevitable friction between the Army’s style and desire to move at the speed of light, and the more cautious approach of civilian pro- fessionals with years of experience working in less developed, post-conflict environments. But we learned from each other. One critical initiative was the contribution of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, created to work in post-conflict transi- tions. In Iraq OTI had an extra- ordinary leader, who immediate- ly grasped the need to put large numbers of Iraqi men to work and refined the mechanisms to do it virtually anywhere in the country on literally a few hours’ notice. This capacity had tremendous appeal to the 1st CAV, which was trying to pry young men away from the insur- gency with jobs. Thanks to OTI, USAID was able to commit to employing 40,000 people per month, and at times was employing over 60,000. OTI became so closely integrated with 1st CAV planning that we requested and received a liaison offi- cer who worked, lived and ate with us. This con- tributed enormously to communications and helped to educate both sides to the limitations and capabilities of each. But the real key was the fact that Gen. Chiarelli and I had a shared vision of what was needed in Baghdad; political awareness that enabled us to assess the way ahead; and — most importantly — the firm conviction that ours was a partnership with little place for ego or petty squabbling with each other or among our staffs, which we encouraged to work together at all levels. Our partnership showed immediate results in parts of Baghdad, such as Al Rashid and Nine Nissan, in the reduction of violence levels and improved cooperation of the populace. But areas such as Sadr City remained under the sway of insurgents, as did cities such as Najaf, Karbala, Falluja, Sammara and Tal Afar. Nevertheless, MNF–I recognized that the “1st CAV Model” held great promise in those cities, if it could be immediately employed after combat operations to take them back. Such a sudden strategic shift, however, involved herculean efforts to overcome the 2207 framework restrictions. The model was first employed in Najaf, and involved close cooperation between MNF–I and a multiagency team deployed immediately after the successful con- clusion of combat operations. The team worked close- F O C U S 58 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 6 MNF–I recognized that the “1st CAV Model” held great promise in those cities, if it could be immediately employed after combat operations to take them back.