The Foreign Service Journal, March 2006

ly with local leaders and military commanders to identify priori- ties, particularly those that could be immediately addressed. Again, the ability of OTI to immediately put large numbers of Iraqis to work, often at cleaning up the damage and removing accumulat- ed solid waste, was highly benefi- cial. The model worked best in Najaf, Falluja and Sadr City, once MNF-I was able to establish a relatively secure envi- ronment and local leaders supported the effort. As soon as the local population was convinced that the Coalition was there to provide security and improve the lives of the population, security incidents and the influ- ence of insurgents decreased rapidly. In Sammara and Tal Afar, however, security was not sustained, and reconstruction efforts again stalled. Even where the tactic was successful, subsequent reliance on the Interim Iraqi Government and the central ministries to implement projects was misplaced. In particular, the IIG’s slow response in making agreed compensation payments, to enable the rebuilding of busi- nesses and homes destroyed in the fighting, diminished the impact of the Coalition’s rapid response. The Right Stuff Iraq remains the most dangerous operating environ- ment for civilians since Vietnam. Implementing multi- billion-dollar programs in a country the size of California, under deadly peril, is a supreme challenge that requires both civilian and military involvement. (The USAID program had 9,000 projects spread across all 18 governorates of Iraq.) My experience on the F O C U S M A R C H 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 59 Administrative officers, controllers and first-rate contracting officers are very hard to attract to a war zone.