The Foreign Service Journal, March 2006

ground from February 2004 to March 2005 underlined the importance of two factors for suc- cess in such missions: the capacity to place the right officers on the ground, and a truly synergistic relationship between civilian and military components. The standing capacity to place the right officers, anywhere in the world, within a few days, is essen- tial for effective post-conflict sta- bilization and reconstruction operations, but is current- ly nonexistent. Without it, the process is inevitably improvised — as was strikingly the case in Iraq. This was not particularly surprising to me; in my experience, USAID’s response to post-conflict transition has always been fairly ad hoc. Though the agency is often por- trayed as a massive bureaucracy, in reality it has only about 1,000 Foreign Service officers. The cadre of offi- cers willing, able and competent to serve in dangerous, primitive postings, far from their families, is very small indeed. The same is true, to a lesser extent, in the State Department, though its ranks of Foreign Service officers are far larger. Accordingly, one tends to see the same small cadre again and again in the hot zones. Although this contingent is highly compe- tent, it is too thin. The current effort of the State Department to expand this capacity, through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, is on the right track. But the uncertainty of funding may militate in favor of a smaller permanent staff to conduct planning, gaming and monitoring and a ready reserve of serving officers, contractors and pre- selected institutional contractors. F O C U S 60 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 6 Our collaboration with the 1st CAV worked, in part, because my staff was empowered to say ‘no’ to the military.