The Foreign Service Journal, March 2006

Fortunately, this is beginning to happen. To facilitate integration, there is much to be gained by having military and civilian decision- makers co-located, enabling res- pective staffs to work closely together. This is very different, however, than embedding civilian staff within military units, or vice versa. It is critical that decision- makers have a shared vision and that both sides understand that they are partners. This is often difficult for the war-fighting com- mander who “owns his area of responsibility.” While unity of command and control is vital in war- fighting, nation-building requires partnerships within a universe of disparate, independent players who each bring unique skills to the effort. If co-location is viewed by either party as an instrument of control, the partnership never develops. Our collaboration with the 1st CAV worked, in part, because my staff was empow- ered to say ‘no’ to the military. This checks-and-bal- ances approach ensured that bad ideas were not pur- sued, though I am sure it frustrated the military on occasion. Give and Take Civilian practitioners of foreign assistance often take the long view, based upon years of experience. By con- trast, the military is mission-oriented and tends to throw massive resources at a problem with the objec- tive of overcoming it as quickly as possible. Both views have merit. Civilian agencies implementing post-con- flict reconstruction have to recognize that the initial efforts must obtain rapid results, in order to win trust — from the military and, more importantly, from local residents — and establish the base for the vital long- term, transformational efforts in structural reform, across all sectors. Work programs, such as those we accomplished with OTI, win hearts and minds and offer force protection. They are an element of stabilization, but they are expensive and transitory. They buy time for the preparatory work for the reconstruction phase to take root so that jobs are provided by the private sector. In a hot war, this initial phase may last for years, longer than in more stable environments. The short-term effects are seductive, particularly for the rotation-driven military; but if continued too long, and if not complemented by real eco- nomic growth, these programs can prove counterproductive. For their part, military practition- ers must recognize that projects are rarely the end-state and must exercise the patience to allow conditions to gel. Civilians and the military also tend to measure results differently. DOD and military commanders have an insatiable appetite for data to enable them to track “metrics.” Often, USAID did not track the same data and was unable to provide the military with what it had requested. Further, we were reluctant to release raw data, particularly grid coordinates, as dissemination could endanger our contractor and NGO partners as well as project beneficiaries. We also found that the military was far more centralized than USAID, and our highly decentralized operations were often hard for the military to comprehend. For instance, we were some- times unable to report precisely which community pro- jects would be initiated in the next 90 days, and where, because we let the communities decide their own pri- orities. There needs to be a coordinated effort — from the interagency level on down — to define what data should be collected and how it will be shared. It is also critically important, in the age of videoconferencing, that too-detailed metrics do not become the lure that pulls Washington policy-makers into the weeds of pro- ject management and implementation. Finally, productive relationships between organiza- tions often depend on personalities, rather than a pro- cedural template. Pete Chiarelli and I clicked, and we made sure that the spirit of our relationship per- meated both organizations, at every level. There were rough spots and some stumbles, but the partnership we had with the 1st CAV was the most rewarding of my career. n F O C U S 62 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 6 There needs to be a coordinated effort — from the interagency level on down — to define what data should be collected and how it will be shared.