The Foreign Service Journal, March 2007

Foreign Service member travels outside “the wire” anywhere in Iraq without a personal security detail or military movement team. The impact of the requirement to travel with armed guards for conducting diplomacy is profound. The DS force protection rules are fairly uni- form for the entire country, although local conditions vary great- ly. Even in the so-called garden spot of Erbil, in Iraqi Kurdistan, FS members cannot trav- el outside the secure compound without a personal secu- rity detail. Thus one constant question for personnel at all the PRTs is “Who gets the PSD?” Plans generally have to be made several days in advance, and may be cancelled at the last minute. While security restrictions do limit the oppor- tunities to engage with Iraqis and cause frustration for FS members who need to meet with Iraqis to do their jobs, none of the FS members who spoke with the FSJ suggest- ed the restrictions should be eased. They know they are targets in an extremely dangerous security environment. Depending on the PRT, security details are provided either by a contractor (usually Blackwater) or by the mili- tary. Contractor-provided security is more expensive to the U.S. government than DOD-provided security. However, several FSOs who served on PRTs point out what they see as a critical difference between contractor- provided PSDs and military-provided security: the prima- ry job of contractor-provided PSDs is to protect the “asset” (the FS member), while military personnel have the dual role of protecting the civilian and also engaging the enemy. The military movement teams tend to have less PSD experience and less training for PSD work. The shift of security support from a designated PSD to the military at one PRT — as well as the removal of regional security officers from field offices where PSD support has been shifted to the military—was the subject of a Dissent Channel message in 2006 (one of very few dissent mes- sages sent to the State Department that year). “It’s not a one-size-fits-all model,” explains Stephenson. “Originally, we thought you can’t work if you can’t get out. … We have creative folk out there; they find a way,” she says. Some meetings can be conducted by cell phone or even outside of the province or the country altogether, in a safer locale. Stephenson acknowledges that many of the accomplishments of the PRTs to date have been due to “heroic ad hoc” efforts by FS members. “Existing relationships allow more to get done than you would think,” Stephenson says. “We get great reporting from the PRTs. They do manage. That’s what FS people do.” Tripwires? In recent months, the security situation in a number of the PRTs has gotten increas- ingly dangerous. In most U.S. missions around the world, deciding whether or not to attend a meeting does not usually feel like a life-or-death decision; but in many PRTs, it does. In Mosul, for example, a regional securi- ty officer and three security contractors were killed by a vehicle-based improvised explosive device in September 2005 while advancing a meeting between FSOs and provincial government officials. PRT mem- bers must constantly evaluate conditions and risks, not only for themselves but for those who protect them and for the Iraqis who may put themselves in danger by meeting with them. The deteriorating security situation in a number of provinces has led to a loss of Iraqi staff, some of whom have faced threats and worse for work- ing with Americans. Having fewer Iraqi staff members, in turn, means even less access to the local population. In response to questions about “tripwires” in Iraq — the lines that mark the point at which conditions warrant a drawdown or evacuation of civilian personnel — no one offered a clear answer, perhaps by design. The oft-repeat- ed observation from all corners of the Iraq discussion — “If the security situation in Iraq was present anywhere else, we’d have either drawn down or shut down the embassy” — is answered with, “Iraq is different.” According to this view, Iraq is the U.S. administration’s policy issue number one, so the Foreign Service has to be there. But what level of risk is too high, and how large a civilian presence is appropriate? The official response to a request to the State Department director general for a description of the security conditions for FS PRT members was answered by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security: “Security of U.S. missions is a top priority for Diplomatic Security. We have a robust security program at each post tailored to each mission’s specific needs. Our regional security offi- F O C U S M A R C H 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 31 It can take days to get out of a PRT locale, even to reach Baghdad — and then days to get back to the PRT.