The Foreign Service Journal, March 2007

Iraq PRT positions have the neces- sary experience or skills to be effec- tive. Some entry-level officers are already being sent to PRT jobs, and many personnel serving in Iraq do not speak Arabic. In addition to FS and military personnel, Iraq PRTs are staffed by civilian contractors working in a number of capacities, from security to local governance to public affairs. Many of them are “3161s,” hired to staff temporary organizations such as the Baghdad-run Iraq Recon- struction and Management Office and the National Coordination Team under it. Some Foreign Service members express concern that while many contractors have needed expertise, they can also cause difficulties for the mission because they are not familiar with the procedures, chain of command and cul- ture of the agencies for which they work. One FS PRT member, who asked not to be identified, says, “We’ve got so many 3161s running around, which presents a whole different set of issues — contractors rating FSOs, not knowing anything about how the State Department func- tions, operational security issues, etc.” Several FS PRT members pointed out that there are 3161s serving as Iraq provincial action officers, in the same positions as Foreign Service officers, yet without the diplomatic training or experience — and for double the salary. In some cases, Foreign Service employee evaluation reports are being completed by 3161s from the National Coordination Team. This can cause problems, as Andrea Gastaldo explains, because they “are not versed in State- speak; nor do they understand the core precepts that will help JOs move along in their careers.” Too Little, Too Late? “On balance, the PRT experience in Iraq demonstrates individual successes arising from individual efforts and improvisations, which allowed some PRTs to move for- ward with their capacity-development mission,” the Special IG report concludes. “Lessons learned from the PRT experience in Afghanistan showed that the lack of specific guidance led to confusion about civilian-military roles at PRTs. Similarly, executing an effective PRT pro- gram in Iraq would have been greatly enhanced if [State and DOD] shared a common understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities.” Foreign Service members at PRTs operate in an extremely dan- gerous and challenging work envi- ronment, in many cases still without sufficient resources and support, while the security conditions in most places become worse. Some locations have become so danger- ous that it is extremely difficult for FS team members to arrange for off-base engagements with Iraqis, which has an impact on effective- ness, no matter how creative the individuals. This is the case in Basrah, where, at last check, FS PRT members were unable to leave the base at all. In some cases, FS team members are located outside the province they cover (leading to the informal title “virtual PRT”) and access to the province is extremely limited due to travel restrictions based on the security situation. And covering provinces that no longer have a U.S. military presence can be almost impossible for FS PRT members because of access problems. This will be an issue to watch as more provinces transition to Iraqi military control. As one PRT leader who asked not to be identified reflects, “The PRT concept came late to the party. More often than I’d like to admit I’ve looked at things we’re doing now and thought to myself, ‘Shouldn’t we have got- ten started on this before we ended the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] and told the Iraqis that they would be running the country themselves again?’ “Some of what we bring to the table now no longer gives us the ability to shape events the way we once could, sometimes as recently as six months ago,” this team leader continues. “American reconstruction funds amount to perhaps 10 percent of what provinces will get from the central government in 2007; in some cases we’re just redoing work that was either done badly or not complet- ed by coalition forces and their contractors over the past several years. Gradual redeployment of U.S. forces has eliminated or greatly reduced our presence on the ground in key areas. That trend will continue as more provinces transition to provincial Iraqi control. Our training and capacity-building programs may find their appeal start to wane with local governments, which now have been in F O C U S M A R C H 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 37 “We must continue to get civilians and diplomats out of our embassy, out of the capital, and into the field, all across the country.” — Secretary Rice