The Foreign Service Journal, March 2007

power for two years even though new provincial elections should have happened months ago.” The Risk-Reward Equation For some, the experience has been so frustrating that it has led to the conclusion that a U.S. diplomatic presence is not productive. There may be a point at which the secu- rity risks and the security restrictions make doing the job impossible. Team Leader Munshi got to this point in January, and has this to say about the situation in Diyala: “There has been a steady deterioration in the security sit- uation since my arrival in April 2006. It has virtually halt- ed our work. We are able to get out to meet people because of our military movement team support, but many of the Iraqis with whom we work don’t have the same support and don’t come to work. A fair number have been killed or kidnapped, or have fled the area/coun- try. Economic activity is virtually at a standstill.” Going on, Munshi says, “Every mission is a trade-off between risk and reward. If the amount of risk is accept- able when weighed against the reward, yes (we should be here). If not, no. In my province, we are moving very close to ‘No.’ This applies to all civilians, not just to FSOs.” Bob Pope sums up the Iraq PRT program this way: “The PRT concept is both too early and too late — too early because you can’t do development and institution- building in live-fire zones and too late because, four years into this war, it’s way past the time when we have any hope of winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. They have been disappointed too many times to believe much of what we say. After hundreds of millions, if not billions, spent on a laundry list of projects, most Iraqis still don’t have potable water, reliable electrical service, operational F O C U S 38 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 7 Foreign Service members serving in PRTs were asked for suggestions for improvements that would enable the Foreign Service to function more effectively in the PRTs. One PRT leader, who asked not to be identified, offered a list of sug- gestions that reflects themes cited by many of the people who contributed to this report. • Clear lines of authority vis-à-vis the embassy. PRT leaders report to the chief of the National Coordination Team, who reports to the head of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. Within a PRT, though, the IRMO rep reports to the PRT leader. It would be clearer if the PRT team leaders reported to the deputy chief of mission, or at least to someone who does. • Clear lines of authority vis-à-vis the military in-the- ater. Though the hope is for an increasingly civilian face to the transition to Iraqi control, our military brethren (who are more numerous and have greater ease of movement) interact regularly — sometimes more often than we do — with provincial political leadership, tribal sheiks and the popula- tion at large. If there’s good coordination our contacts get the same messages from the civilian and military sides, but that’s not always a given. • Clearer policy guidance from Baghdad and Washington. Exactly how clear-cut an idea do we have of how we want the federalism question to turn out, for instance, and how hard are we prepared to push to get that outcome? What level of outside influence (Iranian, Saudi, etc.) are we prepared to tolerate? How bold can we be in making assertions about connections between elected offi- cials (or at least their parties) and militias? Such questions are vital for gauging how to interact with key interlocutors at the provincial level. • More reliable transportation between Baghdad and the PRTs. Civilian members of all PRTs except Baghdad get back and forth to post only by air. It’s not uncommon because of flight schedules or availability for someone to be stuck in Baghdad for days on end in order to conduct a few hours’ worth of business there. We have to count on a minimum of two days to return from or reach Amman or Kuwait (the two points through which travel to or from Iraq originates). Priority in military-run air movements understandably goes to uniformed personnel, but both operationally and for morale, it would be desirable to have more certainty on in- country travel. • Project/program money. Though we can’t and should not take the place of the local and national government in building a new Iraq, the ability to seize targets of opportunity or to make meaningful gestures with civilian U.S. govern- ment funding would raise our credibility considerably. • More experienced officers and more Arabic-speakers. Suggestions from the Field