The Foreign Service Journal, March 2007

ger the end of American support. This policy is Vietnamization in all but name. Its purpose is not to win an unwinnable war, but to pro- vide political cover for a defeat, and to lay the groundwork for blaming the loss on the Iraqis. Very few accept the president’s assurances that a temporary surge of troops will make any difference — except to the toll of Americans and Iraqis who will die or be maimed. Increased training will make no dif- ference either, for what the Iraqi military and police need is not just technical skill but unit cohesion and loyalty to a viable central government, which is nowhere in sight. When U.S. troops pull back from fighting the insur- gents, violence and chaos will increase across the country. More of the soldiers and police we’ve trained and equipped will join the militias. At home, political pressures to get out of Iraq completely will increase rapidly as the violence gets worse. The surge will be reversed. The mil- itary force left behind to protect the Provincial Reconstruction Teams will be drawn down to — or below — a bare minimum, further increas- ing the dangers for the Americans who remain. Our benchmarks won’t be met. As the situation gets worse, whatever remains of a central government in Baghdad will be even less willing or able to control cen- turies of sectarian and tribal hatreds. The civil war will spiral out of control, giving us the justification we need to get out — blaming the Iraqis for the mess we’ve left behind. But the world will know whose mess it is. F O C U S 52 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 7 The pictures from Iraq 35 years after the collapse of “Vietnamization” are no different than the scenes I experienced firsthand.