The Foreign Service Journal, March 2007

1206 funding had not heard of the program. In several cases, embassy staff saw their role as limited to a review of choices already made by “the military side of the house.” There are successes to report that can provide models to new ambassadors. The ambassador to Yemen appears to have developed one of the best procedures for initi- ating Section 1206 requests. The embassy’s Office of Defense Cooperation works closely with the Yemeni Ministry of Defense to identify needs. The ODC vets these requests through the country team, discussing them with the deputy chief of mission, the political sec- tion chief and a political officer who covers counterter- rorism issues full-time. The ambassador approves the submission to Washington. In Thailand, though all military assistance has been suspended due to the Sept. 19 [2006] coup, the ambas- sador’s deputy chief of mission previously served as a political-military officer, so the ambassador reports a “front office that has a good degree of background knowl- edge about and sensitivity to the military dimensions of the bilateral relationship.” Another ambassador warned against delegating oversight of military programs and activities to the defense attaché or other military compo- nents of the embassy. “The front office must be kept informed, must know when key decisions need to be made, and must make them,” he said. An ambassador to an African country described the situation in his embassy in this way: “We are a small num- ber of people, in a tight community, with a clear hierar- chy. The military respects hierarchy and clarity.” He reports that when he has objections to programs or activ- ities, he says no. EUCOM has a lot of the money to spend “and the atmosphere is that we want to do some- thing with it. My attitude is, ‘The first principle is do no harm.’” He recently suspended country clearance to one military official. The person was gone the next day. Problems and Challenges Despite the welcome arrival of new money and other resources to the country team, the increase in military presence and activities has created challenges and raised reservations and questions. Decisions to take action against terrorists in-country require the approval of the Secretary of Defense and “are coordinated with” the ambassadors, according to Department of Defense guidelines. The State Department perspective is that ambassadors have full authority over all U.S. government activities in-country. While such nuanced differences may seem obscure, they are bound to cause problems. One route toward clarity would be the inclusion of new mili- tary elements under the National Security Decision Directive–38 process. This would “regularize” their pres- ence in-country, specifically placing them under the ambassador’s authority, allowing diplomatic privileges and immunities to be requested for them, and authoriz- ing routine compensation from the Department of Defense for their administrative expenses. The Department of Defense has argued against this process, noting that some military components are part of the rel- evant combatant command. Some but not all ambassadors have insisted on having memoranda of understanding signed with the regional combatant commander to clarify lines of authority. The situation should not be left for resolution in the heat of the moment. All ambassadors should pursue MOUs on military presence that reports to the combatant comman- der and on the broader issue of military action in-country. Or the Department of State should pursue a more sys- temic solution offered by a global memorandum of agreement between the Secretaries of State and Defense. But it is important to get lines-of-authority questions sorted out before directives from the ambas- sador and the combatant commander conflict in an urgent situation. Authority is one issue. Value-added is another. Civilian embassy staff in a number of countries expressed skepticism about the need for and the potential for error by new military personnel. While those sent to work in embassies are expected to be seasoned and experienced professionals, some are seen as poorly trained in infor- mation gathering and only rarely have regional or linguis- tic expertise. Rotational tours of only six months limit F O C U S M A R C H 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 57 Special operations forces are part of the new mix of military personnel at U.S. embassies and provide information to their relevant combatant commanders.