The Foreign Service Journal, March 2007

ambassador must similarly approve or disapprove all military-produced in- formational material and MIST per- sonnel should work under the direc- tion of the country team’s public affairs officer. • In the case of special forces, the ambassador’s authority over military activities in-country should be made clear in a memorandum of under- standing with the relevant regional combatant commands. Such authori- ty would include approving any mis- sion, monitoring its implementation, and terminating it if necessary. An alternate, more systemic solution would be a global memorandum of agreement covering all special forces activities in-country, signed by the Secretaries of State and Defense. Organizing Foreign Assistance. Some countries are now receiving between a quarter and half of their U.S. foreign assistance in the form of security assistance. In one country visited, security assistance is the only form of foreign aid being provided by the U.S. government. Section 1206 assistance, with the exception of Lebanon and Pakistan, is not addressing threats to the United States that are so immediate it cannot be included in nor- mal budget processes. • The Secretary of State should insist that all security assistance, including Section 1206 funding, be included under his/her authority in the new process for rationaliz- ing and prioritizing foreign assistance. Country team meetings organized by the Director of Foreign Assistance at the State Department should include mili- tary representatives in cases where the country is a recip- ient or potential recipient of military funding. Otherwise, there is no guarantee that the mix of civilian and military assistance will be effectively balanced to most directly address the terrorist threat. Rationalizing Missions and Money. The current budgets of the civilian foreign affairs agencies do not reflect their key role in the conduct of the war against ter- ror. In fact, it can be argued that the disparity in the ratio between investments in military versus civilian approach- es threatens U.S. success. • The executive branch should undertake a disci- plined, coordinated and transparent approach to identi- fying both civilian and military coun- terterrorism priorities overseas, assigning appropriate roles, missions and divisions of labor among federal agencies, and requesting robust fund- ing to achieve those priorities. • The legislative branch should fund the civilian foreign affairs agen- cies, particularly the State Depart- ment and the U.S. Agency for Inter- national Development, at a minimum to the level requested by the presi- dent. Continuing to deny the presi- dent his foreign affairs budget by bil- lions of dollars below what he requests is undermining U.S. national interests. The current 12:1 ratio of military spending to spending on the diplomatic and civilian foreign aid agencies risks the further encroachment of the military, by default, into areas where civilian leadership is more appropriate because it does not create resistance overseas and is more experienced. • The administration should develop a comprehensive budget for foreign assistance that incorporates economic, development, humanitarian, security and military assis- tance. All foreign assistance programs should be funded through the foreign assistance accounts, as administered by the Department of State. If foreign assistance is, con- trary to this recommendation, to be funded through both the 150 foreign affairs account and the 050 defense account, the Secretary of State should retain primary authority over its planning and implementation. Otherwise, there is the risk of undermining the Secretary of State’s role both in Washington and in embassies as the manager of bilateral relationships and as the chief arbiter of foreign policy decisions. Regional Strategic Initiative. The Secretary of State should regularize and expand the department’s Regional Strategic Initiative — comprised of regional meetings of ambassadors, regional assistant secretaries and senior interagency personnel, including the combat- ant commands — to focus specifically on the terrorism threat and appropriate counterterrorism responses. With the rapid expansion of counterterrorism activities and the increasing need for interagency agreement in the field on strategies as well as tactics, such meetings should occur at the most senior level possible, with ambassadors them- selves actively engaged and involved. F O C U S 60 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 7 Some but not all ambassadors have insisted on having MOUs signed with the regional combatant commander to clarify lines of authority.