The Foreign Service Journal, March 2008

be noted that a formal three-state federation, as some imagine Iraq could become, will probably not work either. Among other things, federations generally require a minimum of seven or so units, lest the various entities simply consider the hassle of federation not worth the effort and go their own way. Getting There Getting to an 18-state federa- tion will require, first and fore- most, the will of the current Iraqi government. Absent this, it would be difficult to even get started. One of the strongest arguments for a timetable for withdrawal is that it would get the attention of the government and cause it to make the necessary concessions to move the country in the right direction. Second, the process will require a skilled U.N. envoy who has the neutrality and competence to work with all sides to the conflict and garner the concessions to move Iraq onto a new political path. The U.S. would have to promote this individual and allow him to take the lead on political reconciliation. Third, there must be a conference of national unity, with delegates drawn from the provinces to represent their province, not their national party or ethnic group. Stability in Afghanistan flowed from the 2001 Bonn Agreement and the subsequent Loya Jirga (national con- ference), where Afghans could see their nation as a nation, and where they were given a governing structure that was national, not ethnic, in character. Iraq has never had anything like this. It went from a full-scale foreign occupation to an internationally chosen Governing Council that lacked national credibility, and then to leg- islative elections structured in a way that pushed Iraqis into their respective ethnic corners — leaving them sus- picious, angry and increasingly violent. The challenge will be to change the structure of the country without ignoring the hard-fought elections and without starting over on the constitution. A number of experts believe this is possible. It will not be sufficient, however, to simply have the current ethnically based government grant concessions to the opposing ethnic groups. Fourth, in addition to a conference of national unity that would deal with the issue of how the Iraqi government is selected, serious work on the con- stitution, which determines how Iraqis are governed, is needed. Both issues must be addressed. Federation expert David Cameron describes the current constitution as “a gigantic worksite,” that is “incomplete, unclear and evolu- tionary.” He sees the key issues that need work as “rectifying the imbal- ance in power between the center and the regions, establishing key institutions (in particular the upper house and the Supreme Court) and clarifying the distinction between regions and governorates.” Cameron believes that “if the opportunity is creatively seized, the amending process could both extend the national consensus on the constitution to include the dis- affected Sunni community and also improve the worka- bility of its federal provisions.” Fifth, in any plan for a way forward, U.S. forces must begin to unilaterally disengage to get out of the way of the evolving security and political dynamic. This is espe- cially true now that their ability to influence the dynam- ic is falling off sharply. A firm date for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq’s cities, a timetable that puts the government on notice that we will not continue to enable the current dysfunction, would help facilitate this. As much as possible, the disengagement should be tied to changes in the political structure that could lead to national unity. U.S. forces can, however, be kept in overwatch at bases outside the cities for a lengthy period of time, from where they could break up major attacks and movements without being a perpetual presence throughout the country. One of the biggest challenges in such a plan will be managing the Kurds. Kurdish expectations now run so strongly in the direction of statehood that it will be diffi- cult to get them back to a provincially based system where they give up their regional power base. It may simply be too far along to reverse course, and the Kurds will have to be allowed to secede. But the cost of doing so is high enough, both for what it would do to Iraq and what it would do to the region, that it is worth pressing them to walk back from the current semi-independent Kurdish Regional Government and into a provincially F O C U S 26 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 8 In any plan for a way forward, U.S. forces must begin to unilaterally disengage to get out of the way of the evolving security and political dynamic.