The Foreign Service Journal, March 2008

which we operate. Despite the different environment, the precautions we take are not that different from those in place in the rest of Iraq. I respect that these measures are designed to safeguard me and my colleagues, balanc- ing protection — and the resources needed to provide it — against our ability to do our jobs. The good news is that many of my contacts want to work with us and are willing to come to our office (a process that is easier than it would be in Baghdad). The bad news is that it can be very difficult to meet people outside the office: meetings must be scheduled well in advance; and requests are often denied or canceled at the last minute due to limited resources. Still, it’s hard to complain when I think about all of our colleagues in other parts of Iraq. We’re not worrying about mortar attacks or improvised explosive devices, or fearful for the safety of the local staff and our contacts. But what is frustrating is that we may be missing an opportunity. As the security situation stabilizes and as the military draws down throughout Iraq, the responsibility for interaction with the local population will fall more on civilians. If we can’t make that model work in Erbil, how will it be possible elsewhere? Jonathan Cebra Public Diplomacy Officer Regional Reconstruction Team Erbil E NHANCING E FFECTIVENESS State Department employees have been working in Iraq for five years now. (I was an economic officer in Embassy Baghdad from 2006 to 2007.) The question of whether we are effective there should be replaced by a more urgent issue — how we can become more effective given that we are there. How effective any of us is in Iraq depends on the usual factors: persistence, personal skills, teamwork and pro- fessional experience. Language skills help, as does regional experience. Danger, security restrictions and political circumstances do not change the fundamentals of what constitutes effectiveness — just how much of it you need, and the relative importance of the different components. Stress management and teamwork, for instance, suddenly become critical. How we balance risk with effectiveness necessarily depends on how important the work is. Our military col- leagues face this question squarely, accepting that they may be asked to die for their country. In the Foreign Service we are not accustomed to that extreme, usually living in areas of more moderate hardship and danger dif- ferentials. Our heavy presence in Iraq, along with work in other dangerous countries, is changing our under- standing of acceptable risk, and demands more from us as a diplomatic corps and from the State Department as an institution. Organizations that operate with the level of risk found in Iraq must support employees in new and different ways than organizations in safer places. Private compa- nies in Iraq generally do this through long vacations and very high salaries — remuneration that could change the standard of living of employees for the rest of their lives. The U.S. military emphasizes honor and service, along with full support of families, medical treatment and the nation’s gratitude. The office walls of the majors and lieu- tenant colonels I worked with on economic affairs were covered with letters from groups ranging from second- graders to Starbucks workers, thanking them for keeping America safe. The U.S. military, with its experience operating in war zones, also understands the need for clear goals and man- agement in dangerous environments. At times in Iraq the clarity of some goals seemed at best aspirational, with detailed timetables based on Iraqi actions that were high- ly unlikely. But the underlying idea is sound: to prioritize and focus on the most important work you can do, the most effective use of time spent in a dangerous place. Strong management is itself a key element of institution- al support for people in such environments. The military also has a culture of teamwork that is crit- ical in stressful and dangerous circumstances. Time spent in bunkers is not the most pleasant bonding expe- rience, but it seems to work. I felt a sense of responsibil- ity to my colleagues in Iraq, who were all under relentless pressure, far from their families and working ridiculous hours. That knowledge outstripped any sense of urgency toward the queries from the National Security Council or the calls from people claiming they were about to brief the Secretary of Defense on whatever economic issue was the crisis of the day. The stereotype of the brilliant diplomat working indi- vidually on an insightful, long telegram falls apart in a place like Iraq. Instead, what makes sense is agreeing to go to a meeting in a dangerous neighborhood because you trust your supervisor’s judgment of its importance, and you know that if you don’t agree to go, someone else F O C U S M A R C H 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 37