The Foreign Service Journal, March 2008

basis for planning and budgeting. Senior leaders at State and USAID and Congress could get the full pic- ture of foreign assistance at the pro- gram level. And a common perfor- mance framework was established to measure which programs worked and which did not. Recognizing that we give assistance to various types of states with different characteristics, the new framework targets individual countries, emphasiz- ing that they are at different stages of development and need. Equally important, it organizes foreign assis- tance into the different strategic goals we seek to achieve: promoting peace and security; strengthening just and democratic government; helping pop- ulations improve their quality of life; fostering economic growth and devel- opment; and providing humanitarian assistance. The process was not perfect, and it quickly became evident that it required more work. Regional desks were concerned that funding they hoped for would move somewhere else. Embassies felt left out of the process and demanded greater trans- parency. And USAID worried that development funds would migrate to different strategic purposes. Every- one felt the time was too short, the sys- tem was too top-down, and trans- parency was inadequate. When the product — the FY 2008 budget sub- mission— reached Capitol Hill, it met with a frosty reception. The relevant committees had not been consulted early on and had to figure out how the new structures fit the budget cate- gories it knew well. An Unhealthy Development Despite all these objections, creat- ing the F Bureau was the right start, and the lessons of the first year were taken to heart in an after-action review that led to changes. Yet critics on all sides want to go back to business as usual, a process that lacks strategic direction and unity of purpose. At best, they suggest reviving and beefing up USAID, making it more autonomous from State and giving it a clear focus on development. Yet this would just take us back to those unhappy days when it and State were at each other’s throats on a regular basis. One side didn’t understand development, and the other side just didn’t get America’s strategic purpos- es; the result was a dialogue of the deaf and a coordination problem from Hades. More radically, some critics want to go in an entirely different direction. Supported by a good part of the devel- opment community, they are pushing for a wholly separate Cabinet-level Department of Development. But that would only worsen the problem by elevating disputes about assistance to senior policymakers — as if the cur- rent coordination problems were not enough — with State and Defense likely to carry more weight. That idea has other flaws, as well. First, it would further disperse the civilian tools of our overseas engage- ment, as still more entities vie to set policy direction and control resources. Second, it would create a large, expensive and unmanaged orphan — namely, all those foreign assistance programs that do not have “develop- ment” as their primary goal. The list is long: Economic Support Funds, tar- geted assistance to the former Soviet Union, counternarcotics programs, counterterrorism, HIV/AIDS preven- tion and treatment, and peacekeeping training account for more than half of our current bilateral foreign assistance spending. Either we would have to create yet another foreign assistance mechanism for State to plan and oper- ate these programs, or the new Department of Development would have to run them, diluting the mission its advocates are seeking. Neither is an attractive option. Third, development assistance just does not have the heft and popularity at home needed to command addi- tional funding. In fact, the result of creating a separate department could very well be the exact opposite of the goal: the dwindling away of develop- ment assistance, rather than its growth. The dilution of effort that would result from returning to the past or creating yet another agency would likely only enhance the role of the Defense Department in delivering U.S. foreign assistance. DOD already has rapidly growing resources for training and equipping foreign securi- ty forces (e.g., Section 1206 authority), for delivering economic assistance (the Commander’s Emergency Res- ponse Program), and for supporting foreign governments (the Coalition Support Fund, which has provided billions for Pakistan and Jordan, among others). All these programs have mirror programs under State/ USAID authorities (FMF, develop- ment assistance and ESF, respective- ly). And DOD is seeking to make the first two programs permanent and global in scope. Thinking Strategically A weakened foreign policy struc- ture would only load more authority and responsibility on DOD, disap- pointing those, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who have pleaded for greater capability in the civilian sector. Outside analysts and task forces 48 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 8 If opponents of the new approach prevail, DOD will be the winner — not State or USAID.