The Foreign Service Journal, March 2010

20 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 1 0 that could make Iraq “a platform for harming the security of Iran and other neighbors. Why should the U.S. have air bases in Iraq?” Bagh- dad can take care of its own defense, he said, “and the Iraqis should have a real air force of their own. Why are they prohibited from having more than token aircraft and related facili- ties, even for civil aviation? They are not poor. They can purchase fighters and have their own aircraft for both internal and external security.” Addressing Security Concerns Wouldn’t this pose a potential security threat to Iran? Not if Iraq has a sovereign, democratic government, Sheikhattar said. “There is an absolute majority in favor of Iran” now that the Shiite government is in control, he as- sured me. Iraq is now seeking to buy 108 aircraft through 2011, in- cluding 36 late-model F-16 fighter-bombers from the United States. So far the Pentagon has not made a deci- sion on the F-16s, but it has agreed to sell 24 U.S. attack helicopters and six C-130 transport planes to Baghdad. As if in reply to Sheikhattar, Admiral William J. Fallon, the former commander of the U.S. Central Command, em- phasized in a July 20, 2008, New York Times article that “control of Iraqi airspace” would be an “important compo- nent of the security agreement that would require clear- headed negotiations.” The final draft of the agreement gave “surveillance and control over Iraqi air space” to Baghdad. At the same time, Article 9, Section 2 of the accord permits U.S. aircraft “to overfly and conduct airborne re- fueling;” Articles 5 and 6 envisage the continued U.S. op- eration of bases by allowing U.S. forces the “access and use” of “some necessary facilities” after the withdrawal of com- bat forces; and Article 7 envisages the pre-positioning of equipment under U.S. control. The provision for airborne refueling was a major focus of contention in the negotia- tions on the accord, because it is viewed in Tehran as giv- ing the U.S. Air Force unrestricted operational latitude that could be used for bombing or surveillance missions in Iran. Sheikhattar, now the Iranian ambassador to Germany, points in particular to the giant Balad Air Base north of Baghdad, just 74 miles away from the Iranian border and 429 miles from Tehran, where the U.S. Air Force currently bases two squadrons of F-16 fighter- bombers, each capable of carrying 24 tons of bombs. Balad has also been a launching pad for Qatar-based B-1 bombers and Predator unmanned espionage surveillance aircraft. Spread out over 15 square miles, Balad was second only to Heathrow Airport in London in the volume of its air traffic at the height of the war in Iraq. The expansion and mod- ernization of the base has been steadily proceeding, with $87 million allocated to new construction in the fiscal 2007 budget and $58.3 million more in 2008. This has included hardening its two 11,000-foot runways, which will now be serviceable until 2014, and installing the latest lighting technology for night operations. “We’re good now for as long as we need to run it,” the Chief Air Force Engineer there, Lt. Col. Scott Hoover, told Associated Press corre- spondent Charles J. Hanley. “Ten years?” Hanley asked. “I’d say so,” he replied. The master plan for Balad’s expansion has served as a model for three other air bases near the Iranian border: Al-Asad, where $76 million in new construction is under way, Tallil and Al Kut. While denying that the United States wants “perma- nent bases,” Defense Department officials acknowledge that they hope for “long-term access.” And Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the security accord explicitly envisage a substan- tial U.S. presence and pre-positioned equipment and weaponry. Iran, for its part, will no doubt be carefully monitoring the type of long-range aircraft and surveillance capabilities that turn up at the bases along its borders and whether they are deployed there on a regular basis. The Iranians I met were reconciled to the continued presence of U.S. military personnel for training purposes following the withdrawal of combat forces, and even to U.S. participation in operations against al-Qaida and other Sunni extremist groups. But the future of the air bases will clearly be highly contentious and could well affect the Obama administration’s diplomatic effort to rule out an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. Mutual Interests What has been missing so far in the U.S. posture is a readiness to acknowledge that Tehran, too, has security concerns. This is especially clear in terms of the nuclear F O C U S The principal legacy of the U.S. surge in Iraq is Sunni outrage that could lead to a rebirth of al-Qaida activity there.