The Foreign Service Journal, March 2010

M A R C H 2 0 1 0 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 25 IAEA and UNSCOM to Baghdad to discuss the issue. Gifted with an ex- quisite talent for the use of power, Saddam correctly concluded that he could block inspections at a low cost —certainly nothing that would threat- en his regime. This early lesson set the tone for years of growing friction with inspectors. The worst that would hap- pen if he blocked or delayed inspectors for an hour or two while a site was “cleansed,” a favorite Iraqi tactic, was a con- tinuation of sanctions and very limited military strikes. Secure in that knowledge, Saddam worked to maneu- ver his way out of sanctions while conceding the least amount of access to the inspectors. The dogged persist- ence of UNSCOM and IAEA teams over the years even- tually resulted in Iraq largely being disarmed of WMD— but no one outside Iraq was convinced of this. Indeed, U.S. analysts came to assume that the regime always dis- sembled — and that it did so precisely because it had something to hide: WMD. The Problem of Sanctions Gradually, Saddam also realized that the Security Council (most particularly, the U.S.) would not act to lift sanctions, no matter how much he did to comply with its terms. This, of course, touched on the basic fallacy in the West’s approach: No one really believed that if sanctions were lifted, Saddamwould continue to comply with the dis- armament goals. Moreover, it was highly improbable, once oil and commerce began flowing freely, that the Council would ever agree to reinstate sanctions. Saddamwas astute in giving out oil contracts and too many Council members would have too great a stake in continuing the flow. I discussed this dynamic candidly with many senior regime officials, both before and after the 2003 Iraq War. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz deftly used it to drive a wedge between Security Council members. Russia, France and China were inclined to relieve constraints on Saddam, while the U.S. and Britain remained determined to contain him. Still, Saddam Hussein never lost sight of the fact that Washington was the major player. It was obvious that he derived prestige from being the only leader to stand up and confront the last superpower. Less obvious was his view that he would also attain such status by being allied with Washington. (A general note: We unnecessarily in- flate these tyrants, raising them to our level, every time a president publicly denounces them.) And until 1998, Saddam and other Iraqis clung to the belief that a soften- ing of relations with Washington was possible. After all, during the 1980s the United States had stayed relatively close to Baghdad as it fought against the common threat Tehran posed — even as Baghdad used chemical munitions against the Iranians (and the Kurds inside Iraq). Throughout the 1990s, senior Iraqis repeatedly asked me what it would take to re-engage with Washington. They requested that I convey to the White House their willingness to do almost anything — cooper- ate against fundamentalists, help in the Middle East peace process — if only Washington would talk to Baghdad. In the words of one official, Baghdad could be “the best friend of the United States in the region, bar none.” There was never a direct response. Publicly, our posi- tion was consistent: Baghdad had to comply with all U.N. resolutions, and then relations could improve. At the same time, there were regular statements that the U.S. favored regime change and had no expectation that Saddamwould comply with the U.N. resolutions. Saddam did not know if these were just words, or more. To his highly honed sense of power and influence, it seemed inevitable that the U.S. and Iraq would reconcile. The two nations’ interests were congruent. Both were sec- ular governments. Moreover, Iraq was the bulwark against the radicals in Iran. And as the most powerful Arab coun- try, with great resources including skillful engineers and industrious people, Iraq was far more important than the tribes running the Gulf sheikdoms. Until 1998, Saddam calculated that Washington would eventually “get over” the invasion of Kuwait and resume close ties. Regime officials never grasped that it would be politi- cal suicide for an American leader to open a dialogue with Saddam, no matter what the terms. Nor did they fully un- derstand the uproar over Monica Lewinsky; to them it was inconceivable that a relationship with an intern could hob- ble a superpower. But once Baghdad realized how badly the Clinton administration had been weakened, it pressed the UNSCOM inspection issue to a conclusion. Based on the judgment that inspectors could not func- tion under the conditions Baghdad had imposed, the United States — supported only by the United Kingdom F O C U S After 9/11, Saddam was too slow to understand that the world had changed.