The Foreign Service Journal, March 2010

34 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 1 0 a special representative to focus on the problem of the PKK presence in northern Iraq. Ralston’s stature as a former NATO commander im- pressed Turkish leaders, but they never believed the United States had changed its policy against ki- netic action on the PKK problem. They were right, but the Ralston mission did defuse tensions for a period and helped to catalyze a change in Washington’s thinking. The key action came from Pres. Bush. At his meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan on Nov. 5, 2007, the president did three things. First, he publicly declared the PKK to be “an enemy of the United States, of Turkey and of Iraq.” These words replaced for- mulations about the problem that were more or less ar- dent depending on one’s proximity to Ankara, but were never effective as rhetoric or policy. Second, he agreed with Erdogan that Turkey could conduct limited opera- tions against PKK border encampments in northern Iraq. And third, he undertook to provide U.S. intelligence sup- port for those efforts. A Turning Point Generals James Cartwright, the JCS vice chairman, Petraeus and Craddock visited Ankara days after the White House meeting to show we were serious and to dis- cuss the practicalities. Details were worked out by the commander of U.S. Mission Turkey’s Office of Defense Cooperation, Air Force Major General Eric Rosborg (in consultation with MNF-I and the U.S. European Com- mand), and counterparts at the Turkish General Staff. Deconfliction arrangements were made to prevent unin- tended fire on friendly elements in northern Iraq, and a small center was established to facilitate the real-time sharing of actionable intelligence. Turkey carried out its first cross-border artillery attack on PKK encampments on Dec. 1, 2007, followed by air strikes at Qandil Mountain and bases close to the border on Dec. 16-17. A relentless effort took place in the months that followed. By the summer of 2008, the PKK’s safe haven in northern Iraq was no more. Its training and logistical capabilities had been significantly degraded, and developments in Turkey-Iraq and Turkey-Iraqi Kurd re- lations were isolating it politically, as well. There were hiccups, to be sure. Almost as soon as the smoke cleared from the first Turkish strikes in December, officials re- sponsible for Iraq policy — wor- ried, for good reason, about the additional strain such actions put on the Iraqi political system— said the Turks had made their point and should stop. This did not reflect the president’s undertaking to Prime Minister Erdogan, but throughout the months that fol- lowed, concerns were expressed at all levels that Turkey’s actions posed too much risk to our overall effort in Iraq. Hard work by U.S. officials in Iraq helped maintain calm. A Turkish land incursion that began on Feb. 21, 2008, against PKK bases a few kilometers south of the border produced more strain. It lasted a week. From roughly this point forward, Turkey-Iraq relations and American dealings with Ankara on Iraq began to im- prove. On March 7, 2008, Turkey hosted Iraqi President Jalal Talabani in Ankara — a long-encouraged and long- sought visit that hadn’t been possible earlier. (That Tala- bani made the trip then seemed to indicate that he, too, saw this as exactly the time for Turkey to chart a new re- lationship with Iraq and Iraqi Kurds.) In July, Tayyip Er- dogan made the first visit to Baghdad by a Turkish prime minister in 18 years, and he and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki energized efforts to normalize political, trade and other ties and to support the Iraqi government. Turkey counseled the Iraqis during their 2008 negoti- ations of a status-of-forces agreement with Washington and tried to help on Kirkuk and election law issues. Doors opened for military exchanges and training. Later, Turkey’s Iraq Coordinator Murat Özçelik initiated a dia- logue with senior Kurdistan Regional Government offi- cials. (This process got a boost when Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met with KRG President Masud Barzani in Erbil in 2009.) U.S.-Turkish relations improved, including in the security arena. What accounts for this shift? Our change of policy to allow counterstrikes against the PKK in northern Iraq was a key factor. Turkish authorities, now visibly protecting their citizens, felt politically able to upgrade their en- gagement with Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds. Our consulta- tions had an effect, too, in helping Ankara look past F O C U S Turkey counseled the Iraqis during their 2008 negotiations of a status-of- forces agreement with us and tried to help on Kirkuk and election law issues.