The Foreign Service Journal, March 2010

42 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 1 0 following it had long sought. Current American policy seems clueless about how to reverse these Iranian gains. Meanwhile, Tehran seems on track to acquire the ability to field its own deterrent to the threats of nuclear at- tack Iranians have serially heard from Saddam’s Iraq, successive Israeli gov- ernments and George W. Bush’s America. David Ben-Gurion wrote the book on how to build a clandes- tine nuclear weapons capability. He skillfully appeased President John F. Kennedy’s passion for nonproliferation even as his government subverted and circumvented it. The ayatollahs have read and absorbed the Israeli playbook, minus—one hopes— the bit about Masada. Israelis, bet- ter than anyone, know how this script ends — not in a war that secures their nuclear monopoly in the region. It is time to start thinking about how to mitigate the undeniable dan- gers of an Iranian, as well as an Israeli, nuclear arsenal. I must not close without a brief mention of the long- standing Arab friends of the United States and the West in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea regions. Despite welcome new activism on the part of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have to a great extent been bystanders as a strange combination of Ameri- can diplomatic default and military activism has dismantled the regional order that once protected them. Iraq no longer balances Iran. The United States no longer constrains Is- rael, which has never behaved more belligerently. Iran has acquired unprecedented prestige and influence among Arabs and Muslims. The next stage of nuclear proliferation is upon the region. For the first time ever, Shiismdominates the politics of Arab states traditionally ruled by Sunnis. Is- lamist terrorismmenaces Egyptian and Gulf Arab domestic tranquility, as well as that of the West. The United States, once attentive to Arab security and other concerns, is now obsessed with its own issues and objectives in the region. The Persian Gulf Arabs have the financial resources but neither the institutions nor the will to mount the unified effort needed to cope with these challenges. They are adrift, not sailing to a new strategic strong point. The drift is taking them away from their traditional reliance on America and toward new partners. These are mainly the so-called BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China, plus South Africa. But Egypt and the Gulf Arab states seem destined to remain on the strategic sidelines, not in the game. They will not step forward to take the lead in addressing the disputes of which I have been speaking. Hence the need for contin- uing American leadership. Iraq and the Region So what is to be done? In the case of Israel and Palestine, a failure to de- cide is, in fact, a fateful decision. The avoidance of choice risks future tragedy for America, as well as for Israel and the Arabs. The best thing the United States could do for Iraq now is to engage Baghdad’s neighbors. All should share our in- terest in supporting non-violent Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems. We need to work with Turkey and Arab allies to enlist Syria, Iran and others in this task and hold them to it. In the region as a whole, the American effort to build a coalition of opposition to Iran has failed. We must now join our allies and friends in offering those who have come to depend on Tehran alternatives to doing so. Iran is a proud country that will not surrender to threats. Its people re- main obsessed with the affront they believe we pose to their national identity, independence and honor among nations. Without a parallel normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations, there is no hope of resolving the nuclear issue in a way that mitigates its menace. Pres. Obama’s several messages to the Iranian people have opened a path to respectful Iran- ian-American dialogue that might lead to this. We must persist in inviting Tehran to walk this path with us. Finally, in Afghanistan, we continue to lack a compre- hensive strategy. We must leverage religious and tribal re- alities rather than seeking to overturn them. Our objective should be to consolidate the exclusion of al-Qaida from Afghan territory. To do this, we must work with Pakistan and in partnership with friendly Arab andMuslimcountries, not at cross-purposes with them; and we must support, not undercut, the Pashtun tribes. This, not a Western military presence on Afghan soil, is how we helped Afghans expel the Soviets from their homeland. This, ratified by a recon- vened loya jirga and supported with generous economic as- sistance, is how we can keep al-Qaida out of Afghanistan while we work to expel it from Pakistan. Pres. Obama’s message to the world’s Muslims in Cairo last June illuminated a different way forward than the road we appear to be on. We can yet take that path. It is time to do so. ■ F O C U S In Afghanistan, the Iranians have been able to sit on the sidelines and watch us exhaust ourselves in inconclusive warfare.