The Foreign Service Journal, March 2012

sketchy and verifiable data was even more difficult to attain, but anecdotal evidence was starting to mount that the ultra-secretive country was staring down the bar- rel of a full-blown famine. Mak- ing matters worse, summer floods, which some observers de- scribed as reaching biblical pro- portions, pounded the country. For the first time, the DPRK had to consider making a serious public appeal for outside support. There had been overtures to the United Nations in 1991 and 1994, but those discussions broke down over the World Food Program’s strict requirements for trans- parency — and also, some claim, because President Kim Il Sung personally refused to accept outside help. This attitude was a foreseeable result of the country’s principal political belief, “Juche,” which loosely translates as “self-reliance.” The ideology, which gradually emerged over time, has three main principles: political independ- ence, economic self-sustenance and military self-reliance. Any overt support from the outside, particularly from countries North Korea considered unfriendly, would un- dermine Juche and was therefore unacceptable. It is quite possible that had Kim Il Sung survived longer, the famine could have grown much worse. But as power shifted from father to son, and the sheer magnitude of the disaster became clearer, Kim Jong Il’s government began to seriously consider accepting our assistance. Assessing the Disaster As a director for democracy, human rights and human- itarian affairs at the National Security Council, I traveled to Pyongyang during the winter of 1995 with a team of ex- perts to assess the extent of the humanitarian crisis and dis- cuss the possibility of American aid. Led by Len Rogers from the U.S. Agency for International Development, our delegation included Senate Foreign Relations committee staffer Munro Richardson and several other officials. What struck me most about the briefings we received before departing was how little anyone really seemed to know about North Korea. I still remember one Korea watcher telling us to look for fresh graves facing south or to- ward mountains for an indication of how widespread the famine was. But never during my two years in North Korea did I see any evidence of mass gravesites. Two USAID officials, Jon Brause and Dave Hagen, had al- ready traveled to Pyongyang to set the stage for our visit. Their ef- forts to facilitate our mission proved invaluable, and both went on to contribute greatly to U.S. humanitarian efforts there. At the time, all journeys to Py- ongyang originated in Beijing, where Air Koryo, the national airline, operated twice-weekly flights. Blacklisted from op- erating out of Western Europe, the carrier had a dismal reputation. But it was our only option. Looking out the window of the Illyushin Il-62 we were taking, I made my- self ignore the bald spots on the tires. It didn’t help that the plane’s interior reminded me of pictures I’d seen of my grandparents’ cross-continental trips back in the 1950s. On our arrival in Pyongyang, we were whisked away into rounds of meetings, most of which focused on our proposed itinerary. Though our trip was highly orches- trated, we saw enough to make clear that the country faced a huge problem. The full extent of the 1995 famine may never be known, but it appears that between as many as 3.5 million people perished. That would put North Korea just behind China in terms of 20th-century famine-related deaths. And taking into account the fact that the DPRK’s population is a fraction of its neighbor’s, it would rank num- ber one. In response, the United Nations, with strong American support, initiated one of its largest humanitarian operations in its history. Japan and South Korea, also considered en- emies by North Korea, soon joined the United States as the largest contributors to the U.N. relief effort. My Second Stint in Pyongyang Nearly a decade later, in 2004, I found myself back in North Korea, this time as the World Food Program coun- try representative. Managing a program that I’d helped create, we were tasked with feeding 6.5 million people, nearly a third of the country. This time around, however, I had something else to worry about: my wife and 1-year-old daughter accompanied me, making us the first American family ever to reside in North Korea. Our apartment was in a lime-green high-rise building, one of several occupied by most of the roughly 250 other foreigners in the capital. Most ambassadors lived inside F OCUS What struck me most about the briefings we received before departing was how little anyone really seemed to know about North Korea. M A R C H 2 0 1 2 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 23