The Foreign Service Journal, March 2012

M A R C H 2 0 1 2 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 29 tributed to an increase in the number of Taliban recruits. A third coping mechanism is theft. Amartya Sen notes that a dramatic in- crease in criminality occurs during famines as men, particularly those with weapons, steal food to survive. The North Korean famine of the mid- 1990s led to so widespread an increase in theft and criminality that the regime instituted public hangings as a deterrent measure. While harsh, such a re- action bears out the reality that increased criminality that goes unpunished and uncontrolled erodes the state’s le- gitimacy. This is even more true in fragile and failed states. Managing Food Price Volatility To address these risks and minimize the chances that food shortages will become famines, donor aid agencies and developing countries should implement a four- pronged strategy to manage future price volatility, in co- operation with the other donor governments, World Bank and United Nations agencies. • First, donor governments and developing countries alike should invest in agricultural development programs. Boosting agricultural productivity in fragile and failed states will help insulate them from price shocks. Presi- dent Barack Obama’s Feed the Future initiative is one ex- ample of what donor governments can do through their aid programs to increase food production. Similarly, they should support World Bank President Robert Zoellick’s $1.2 billion plan to use grants and loans to support agricultural development in countries most af- fected by the sharp price increases. This initiative fol- lows in the footsteps of the Green Revolution, which a generation ago tripled crop yields in Asia, saved more than a billion lives and kept 16 million square miles of forest from being cut down. Specifically, donor governments and international in- stitutions should invest more in improved drought-resis- tant grain varieties, including those born of research into genetically modified organisms and seeds that are more resistant to insects and disease. Reducing the vulnerabil- ity of African farmers to crop losses will help bring a new Green Revolution to a continent that is particularly vul- nerable to food insecurity. Donor governments and international institutions should also launch a concerted effort to counter the anti-biotech cam- paigns being conducted by advocacy groups. Such campaigns have already delayed, if not paralyzed, the large- scale dissemination of genetically modified seed varieties where they are most needed to address crippling food shortages. Because these programs will take 20 years to mature and produce sustainable results, they cannot be expected to alleviate severe food insecurity over the short term. The Green Revolution helped win the Cold War, but it took three decades to implement. • Second, improve the international humanitarian re- sponse to rapid increases in food prices. This can be done through new policy tools, new, market-based approaches and improvements in existing tools. One system that can serve as a model is the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network. FEWSNET collaborates with international, regional and national partners to provide early warning and vulnerability information on food se- curity issues in 25 high-risk countries. The $1.2 billion food aid budget used to address famines and other emergencies under U.S. law should be more flexible. Currently, the budget is used primarily to purchase U.S. food to distribute abroad, an approach that is inefficient and costly. More than 20 percent of food aid is used for shipping costs, and another 45 percent goes for logistics, overhead and distribution costs. Even at that, it takes four months to order, purchase, ship and distribute food aid abroad. President George W. Bush’s 2004 proposal to reform the U.S. government’s food aid program, which would have dedicated 25 percent of the USAID Food for Peace aid budget to purchase local production, was simple and makes eminent economic sense. It would reduce delays in the delivery of U.S. purchased food and logistical risks, in addition to saving transport costs. But lamentably, the idea went nowhere, as Congress continues to resist giving USAID flexibility in allocating food aid resources because of pressure from the farm lobby and shipping interests. • Third, employ emergency market interventions when food prices rise too rapidly and too steeply to be managed. This is now possible through an innovative $300 million food intervention account run by USAID’s Food for Peace F OCUS Famine is not a single event, but unfolds insidiously over months or years.