The Foreign Service Journal, March 2012

6 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 1 2 College in Quantico, Va., and as an ad- junct professor at George Mason Uni- versity. As an FSO, I led a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq for 13 months, and as a member of a Joint Defense/State inspection team I in- spected eight PRTs in Afghanistan. In each instance where Foreign Service officers were deployed, I de- tected conflicts between their assigned roles and the roles they were forced to play in the interagency setting. I found this to be particularly true with PRTs where the military, nongovernment or- ganizations and contractors proscribed the roles that FSOs could perform. The issue of interagency coordina- tion is a major discussion point in all of the classes at NFATC, Quantico and George Mason where cooperation be- tween agencies is needed to accom- plish an overall mission. Classroom discussions focus on the various cul- tures found inside government agen- cies and how the agencies often work at cross-purposes because of their cul- tures and leadership. If the conflicts are not rectified, it could lead to diffi- cult and dangerous situations in the field. Last May, I was an adviser to the graduating class at the Marine Corps University Command and Staff Col- lege. The graduation exercise involved the fictitious deployment of a Marine force to assist a foreign nation in stabi- lizing its internal governmental func- tions and to recover from a natural disaster. I was struck by the total lack of understanding, on the part of the civil- ian and military students, about the roles FSOs and the State Department should play in these types of situations. As the U.S. role in the world changes to meet current and future emergencies and conflicts, the indis- pensable role of the Foreign Service must be better explained to the other agencies. In addition, employees of other governmental agencies must be better educated about the roles and ca- pabilities their own agencies offer in these situations. John M. Jones Ambassador, retired Alexandria, Va. The FS Profile As a former FSO currently working with a private foundation at Fort Leav- enworth, I found that George Lam- brakis’ letter in the December issue, “Organizational Personality and Man- agement,” reflects many of my own ex- periences in bridging the cultural gap that often divides FSOs andmilitary of- ficers. As a political adviser at U.S. Strate- gic Command, I was amused by the rigidity of rank that extended to by- name, rank-based seating assignments at staff meetings. Then, after retiring, I spent several years working intera- gency issues at Fort McNair in Wash- ington, D.C. There I saw how the military’s precise planning culture often collided with the more relaxed ap- proach practiced at many civilian agen- cies. Years earlier, while a student at the National War College, I had attempted to describe the differences in organiza- tional personality between the Foreign Service and the military in a paper I wrote using the Myers-Briggs Type In- dicator as the basis for my analysis. Based on data furnished by the State Department, I was able to de- scribe an MBTI profile of the Foreign Service that was different, not better, than that of our military colleagues. The Foreign Service Institute found the paper worthwhile enough to use in its classrooms for a number of years. Recently, I sought the department’s assistance in obtaining current MBTI data to update the now 25-year-old paper, but was rebuffed. I was told that the State Department no longer main- tains the basic data and that it would not share them with me in any event. I have long suspected that the MBTI profile of the Foreign Service has changed over the intervening years. The fact that the department seems disinterested in introspection and self- analysis seems to prove the point. Ted Strickler FSO, retired Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Beirut, 1983 Marvin Kalb was incorrect to assert before an AFSA audience that Presi- dent Ronald Reagan “did nothing” after Islamic fanatics blew up the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 (January AFSA News , p. 58). In fact, Reagan immediately au- thorized a contingency plan to inter- vene on the island of Grenada, where a rival faction of the radical New Jewel Movement had just staged a sanguinary coup, seemingly thereby endangering a number of American students. The successful intervention took place on Oct. 25, 1983, against token resistance by some Grenadians, and more serious opposition from armed Cuban work- men engaged in construction of a strategically useful airport. The result was establishment of a more representative government on the island and the expulsion of the Cubans, including a military contingent inserted by Fidel Castro, who had cor- rectly anticipated Reagan’s response. In truth, Pres. Reagan didn’t want L E T T E R S