The Foreign Service Journal, March 2014

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2014 29 ment on the shape of the table. All that was done in that period under the secret negotiation. FromMay, June, July, August, [the North Vietnamese] wouldn’t give a thing. We had been pressing them: What would we get if we gave a total bombing halt? For the total bombing halt we wanted, specific things had to happen. Finally, all of a sudden one day, the head of their delegation, a member of the Politburo, said to Harriman and Vance, “If we do so and so and so, will you stop the bombing?” At that point, you knew you had it. It was just that stubbornness and reading reams of propaganda bullshit, even in the secret talks. They finally agreed to what we needed, and what we wanted, and the deal was cooked in October 1968. And then something happened. ... before the election. Some- body got to [South Vietnamese President Ngyuen Van] Thieu on behalf of Richard Nixon and said, “Don’t agree, come to Paris.” It was done right here inWashington. A Republican went to a famous woman called Anna Chennault. Anna Chennault went to the Vietnamese and told them: “We’ll get a better deal under Nixon.” SoThieu refused to accept the agreement and sent a del- egation to Paris. Clark Clifford was fit to be tied. Harriman was about to climb the wall. Well finally, of course, the election was held and Hum- phrey lost. I’m convinced that if Hubert Humphrey had won the election, the war would have been over much sooner. Instead, a new group came along. You couldn’t get the thing cranked up until after the inauguration, whichmeant youmarked time until January 1969. Meanwhile the [South] Vietnamese agreed to come, so they formed their delegation, and the Viet Cong came with their delega- tion. People said it took us three months to decide on the shape of the table, but that was a bunch of shit. We knewwhat shape the table was going to be from the beginning; it was going to be a round table. It was the only way you were going to solve the problem. We knew that, but we had to go through this whole routine of satisfying the South Vietnamese, and beating down the argu- ments of the North Vietnamese who wanted the Viet Cong as an equal delegation. They talked about a four-party negotiation, and we talked about an “our side, your side” negotiation. We finally resolved the problemby a round table. We knewwe were going to do that. But you couldn’t solve anything when you didn’t have delegations. The new administration appointed Cabot Lodge as head of the delegation and, of course, he had a so-called number two called Walsh, a lawyer fromNew York who didn’t know anything about the problem. He was a Republican lawyer fromNew York who was in the early Nixon administration. Cabot came and we began sort of floundering around. At that point Henry Kissinger entered the negotiations by deciding that he’s going to run the secret negotiating. He had Dick Walters, who was then the military attaché, set up the negotiation, and said nothing to us. Henry lacked confidence in the secrecy of the Foreign Service. [Kissinger] had with himWinston Lord, Tony Lake, and this character, Walters. None of them knew anything about anything at that point compared to us. … n Clark Clifford was fit to be tied, and Averell Harriman was about to climb the wall. –Philip Habib W. Averell Harriman, right, head of the U.S. delegation, and Cyrus R. Vance, left, leaving the Paris Vietnam peace talks on Oct. 24, 1968. Pierre Boulat/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images